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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case is about whether Respondent, Gooding County (hereinafter "the County") has 
the authority under constitutional and legislative provisions to site large beef and dairy operations 
in the county. Specifically, whether the provisions of Gooding County CAFO Ordinance No. 90, 
(hereinafter "Ordinance# 90") adopted June 12, 2007 by the Gooding County Board of 
Commissioners (hereinafter "BOCC") are valid. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Appellants, Idaho Dairymen's Association, Inc., and the Idaho Cattle Association, Inc., 
(hereinafter "CAFO operators") have set forth in Appellant's Brief, a mostly sufficient statement 
of the course of proceedings; except, please note the omission of any mention of the County's 
November 16, 2007 motion to dismiss the action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(2), 12(b)(4) and 
4(i)(2) noted in the District Court's Judgement on Summary Judgement, III. Brief Procedural 
History. R. Vol.6, p. 1229. Further, please note the omission of any mention of the County's 
December 17, 2007 Motion to Dismiss raising several affirmative defenses and a claim of res 
judicata, R Vol. 1, p. 87 LL 3-5. 
C. Statement of Facts 
This lawsuit was filed November 29, 2008, by the CAFO operators petitioning the Court 
for declaratory judgement regarding the validity and constitutionality of the provisions of 
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Ordinance #90. The CAFO operators, in their action, do not bring a challenge to the validity of 
the creation of Ordinance #90, but they bring facial challenges to the validity and 
constitutionality of certain provisions of Ordinance #90. Lastly, none of the challenges are based 
upon an "as applied" basis, that is, the application of the ordinance to an actual set of facts. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Whether Ordinance # 90 is a valid ordinance under the constitutional 
provisions and Idaho legislative provisions cited by the CAFO operators. 
B. Whether Ordinance# 90, VII (D) (1) unlawfully restrains interstate commerce 
under the specific provisions cited by the CAFO operators. 
C. Whether the sections of Ordinance # 90 cited by the CAFO operators are 
arbitrary and without a rational basis. 
D. Whether the county is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under I.A. R. 41, 
Idaho Code § 12-117, and Idaho Code § 12-121. 
HI. ARGUMENT 
A. County Power 
1. Gooding County Has Idaho Constitutional Authority to Enact Local Police 
Regulations. 
Idaho Constitution, Article 12, section 2. Providing: "Local Police Regulations Authorized. 
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local 
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police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general 
Jaws." 
Case law related to the power counties have to regulate through the police power 
includes the following: The Court in State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365,399 P.2d 955 (1965) upheld 
the conviction of a sub divider of land that failed to comply with a county zoning ordinance. The 
State v. Clark court held: 
Idaho Constitution, Art. 12, Sec. 2, which provides: 
"Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, 
all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its 
charter or with general Jaws." 
This constitutional provision was considered by this court in Statev. Musser, 67 
Idaho 214, 176, P.2d 199, wherein it is stated: 
'Under the above constitutional provision counties, cities and towns have full 
power in affairs of local government notwithstanding general Jaws of the state 
defining and punishing the same offense. Session Laws, 1939, chap. 215, sec. 6, 
p. 441; McQuillan Mun. Corp., 2d Ed., sec. 795, p. 962; City of Delta v. 
Charlesworth, 64 colo. 216, 170 P. 965; State v. Quong [8 Idaho 191, 67 P. 491), 
supra; Continental Oil Co. V. City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89, 286 P. 353; State v. 
Robbins, 59 Idaho 279, 81 P.2d 1078; State v. Hart [66 Idaho 217] 157 P.2d 72; 
Clarkv. Alloway [67 Idaho 32] 170 P.2d 425; People v. Velarde, 45 Cal.App. 520, 
188 P. 59. 
In Gartland v. Talbott, 72 Idaho 125,237 P.2d 1067, this court also stated: 
'Also, to be considered is § 2 of Art. 12 of the State Constitution, which is a direct 
grant of police power to the counties and municipalities of the state, subject to the 
limitation that such power shall not be exercised in conflict with 'the general 
Jaws.' Under this provision the counties and cities of this state are not limited to 
police powers granted by the legislature, but may make and enforce, within their 
respective limits, all such police regulations as are not in conflict with the general 
Jaw.*** 
A county has authority to make police regulations not in conflict with the general 
Jaws, co-equal with the authority of the legislature to pass general police Jaws. 
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Clyde Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 505,210 P.2d 798; 
Rowe v. City of Pocatello, 70 Idaho 343, 2l8 P.2d 695. 
State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365,372,373,399 P.2d 955,959 (1965). 
The State v. Clark Court further held: 
From a review of the cases construing such constitutional provision, it may be 
said that there are three general restrictions which apply to legislation under the 
authority conferred by such provision: (1) the ordinance or regulation must be 
confined to the limits of the governmental body enacting the same, (2) it must not 
be in conflict with other general Jaws of the state, and (3) it must not be an 
unreasonable or arbitrary enactment. 
State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 374, 399 P.2d 955, 960 (1965). 
The State v. Clark Court also held: 
Where a statute, ordinance or regulation presents a proper field for the exercise of 
the police power, the extent of its invocation and application is a matter which lies 
very largely in the legislative discretion, and every presumption is to be indulged 
in favor of the exercise of that discretion, unless arbitrary action is clearly 
disclosed. City of Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 P.2d 461. The 
subject matter of the ordinance being within the police power, and properly 
belonging to the legislative department of govermnent, the courts will not 
interfere with the discretion, nor inquire into the motive or wisdom of the 
legislature. If the act is not clearly unreasonable, capricious, arbitrary or 
discriminatory, it will be upheld as a proper exercise of the police power. Rowe 
v. City of Pocatello, 70 Idaho 343,218 P.2d 695. The courts may differ with the 
legislature as to the wisdom and propriety of a particular enactment as a means of 
accomplishing a particular end, but as Jong as there are considerations of public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare with the legislative body may have had 
in mind, which have justified the regulation, it must be assumed by the court that 
the legislative body had those considerations in mind and that those 
considerations did justify the regulation. When the necessity or propriety of an 
enactment is a question upon which reasonable minds might differ, the propriety 
and necessity of such enactment is a matter of legislative determination. Miller v. 
Board of Public Work5'(1925), 195 Cal. 477,234 P. 381, 38 A.L.R. 1479; 
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1962), 57 Cal.2d 199, 18 
Cal. Rptr. 507,370 P.2d 342. 
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State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 375-376, 399 P.2d 955, 961 (1965). 
LC.§ 31-714 gives the county authority to pass ordinances to promote the safety, health 
and prosperity of its citizens as long as the ordinances are not "repugnant to law." Statutory Case 
law interpreting LC. § 31-714 and the Idaho Constitution Art. 12 § 2 include: Benewah County 
Cattleman's Assn., Inc. v. Board of County Com'rs of Benewah County, 105 Idaho 209,668 P.2d 
85 (1983) ( county allowed to prohibit livestock from roaming free despite huge costs for 
fencing); In Heck v. Commissioners of Canyon County, 123 Idaho 842, 853 P.2d 587, reversed 
by 123 Idaho 826,853, P.2d 571 (1992) (the broad authority given counties allowed the 
regulation of fireworks even though the State's Fireworks Act authority only explicitly 
mentioned cities regulating fireworks); In Miller v. Miller, 113 Idaho 415, 745 P.2d 294 (1987) 
(the creation of herd districts to designate areas of free range and fences is a legislative function 
of the county commissioners). 
2. Enactment of LLUP A Ordinances Pertaining to CAFOs 
The edict ofldaho's Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) is both specific and 
mandatory. LC. 67-6502: "The purpose of this Act shall be to promote the health, safety, and 
general welfare of the people of the State ofldaho ..... " LC. 67-6503: "Every city and county 
shall exercise the powers conferred by this chapter. "The LLUP A contains specific sections 
concerning local authority relating to Concentrated or Confined Animal Feeding Operations 
(CAFO): 
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LC. 67-6529(2) states in part: "Notwithstanding any provision oflaw to the contrary, a 
Board of County Commissioners shall enact ordinances and resolutions to regulate the siting of 
large confined animal feeding operations and facilities ..... ". LC. 67-6529D(3) states: "This Act 
does not preempt local regulation of a CAFO". LC. 67-6529E allows the County to request a site 
suitability determination from state agencies. LC. § 67-6529F requires the Department of 
Agriculture (as the lead agency) to provide a site suitability team and to submit a site suitability 
report. 1 
The County may then "use the report as the County deems appropriate" LC. 67-6529G. A 
clear indication of the autonomy granted Counties separate and apart from any State regulation of 
CAFOs. In this matter the CAFO operators have claimed the County is preempted from enacting 
an ordinance regulating CAFOs despite the legislature's clear command in Idaho Code§ 67-
6529(2) providing in pertinent part that: 
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a board of county 
commissioners shall enact ordinances and resolutions to regulate the siting of 
large confined animal feeding operations and facilities, as they shall be defined 
by the board . .. including the approval or rejection of sites for the operations 
and facilities . ... A board of county commissioners may reject a site regardless 
of the approval or rejection of the site by a state agency. 
Idaho Code§ 67-6529(2). 
1 Interestingly, this section (LC. § 67-6529F sub. 5) allows the director of the Idaho 
Departments of Agriculture, Environmental Quality, and Water Resources to "enter into 
contracts, agreements, memorandums, and other arrangements with federal, state, and local 
agencies to carry out the purposes of this act." 
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Clearly the legislature put the County in charge of siting and put the state agencies in an 
advisory role relative to siting. That said, if the county is in charge of siting, the county cannot 
site a CAPO without knowing where the CAPO will be in Gooding County, how large the CAPO 
will be (how many acres) and how many animals will reside in it. This is true regardless of 
whether the CAPO operation consists of dairy animals or beef cattle. 
The CAPO operators contend that Ordinance #90 flies in the face of, and is irreconcilable 
with, Idaho Code 67-6529 because it forbids ordinances and regulations that deprive farmers of 
the full and complete use of agricultural land. However, The Supreme Court has held that the 
LLUP A must be given effect and construed harmoniously with every provision of the act to the 
extent reasonably possible. See generally Olson v. Ada County, 105 Idaho 18, 665 P.2d 717 
(1983); Whitted v. Canyon County Board of Com 'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 44 P.3d 1173 (2002). 
The Court in Olson v. Ada County, 105 Idaho 18,665 P.2d 717 (1983) noted: "Zoning 
ordinances are, by their very nature, restrictions upon the use of land. Ordinances enacted 
pursuant to the zoning authority granted to localities by the Local Planning Act include those that 
establish zone classifications with permitted and prohibited uses, setback requirements .... " 
Olson v. Ada County, 105 Idaho 18, 21,665 P.2d 717, 720 (1983). 
The Olson v. Ada County Court further noted: "We are not convinced that the legislature 
intended to sacrifice the system of comprehensive zoning so carefully created in the Local 
Planning Act by completely shielding agricultural land from all zoning regulations." Olson v. 
Ada County, 105 Idaho 18, 21,665 P.2d 717,720 (1983). 
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In Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131, 135, 75 P.3d 185, 189 (2003) the Idaho 
Supreme Court noted the history ofldaho Code§ 67-6529: 
In 2000, at the time ofSFLLC's application, LC.§ 67-6529 FN3 provided: 
FN3. Idaho Code§ 67-6529 has been amended twice since the filing ofSFLLC's 
application. The initial amendment, in April 2000, allowed the board of 
commissioners to enact ordinances and resolutions to regulate the siting oflarge 
confined animal feeding operations and facilities, as they shall be defined by the 
board, including the approval or rejection of sites for operations and facilities." 
The amendment also required the board of commissioners to hold at least one 
public hearing affording the public the opportunity to comment. 
The second amendment, effective July 1, 2003, requires board of commissioners 
to enact ordinances relating to large confined animal feeding operations and 
facilities, provided that the definition of the operation is not Jess restrictive than 
provided by LC. § 67-6529C. In other words, the board must enact an ordinance 
for the approval or rejection of all operations over 1,000 AUE. In addition, the 
amendment requires that at a minimum the ordinance must provide for at least one 
public hearing before the board of commissioners allowing the public to comment 
before the siting of such a facility. 
No power granted hereby shall be construed to empower a board of county 
commissioners to enact any ordinance or resolution which deprives any owner of 
full and complete use of agricultural land for production of any agricultural 
product. Agricultural land shall be defined by local ordinance or resolution. 
LC. § 67-6512 establishes that zoning ordinances are to provide notice and 
hearing procedures for the processing of applications for special or conditional use 
permits. A special use permit can be granted if the proposed use is conditionally 
allowed by the ordinance. LC.§ 67-6512. LC. §67-6519 requires that the zoning 
ordinances establish a procedure for processing a permit required or authorized 
under the LLUP A in a timely manner. 
Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131, 135, 75 P.3d 185, 189 (2003). 
3. The Sanitary Inspection of Dairy Products Act 
The Sanitary Inspection of Dairy Products Act, Idaho Code§§ 37-401-- 37-413. Idaho 
Code § 37-401 provides in pertinent part: 
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( 6) The director or his agent may issue a permit to sell milk for human 
consumption to a new or expanding dairy farm only upon presentation to the 
director by the new or expanding dairy farm of: (a) A certified Jetter, supplied 
by the board of county commissioners, certifying the new or expanding dairy 
farm's compliance with applicable county livestock ordinances; and .... (7) 
As used in this section: 
(b) "Expanding dairy farm" means an existing, legally permitted dairy farm that 
increases, or applies to increase, its existing animal units beyond the number 
for which it is permitted under applicable county livestock ordinances or 
increases, or applies to increase, the waste containment system. 
Idaho Code§ 37-401 (West, 200l)(emphases added). 
At the hearing on the summary judgement motion, the Court noted the importance of the 
requirement as to numbers of animals assigned to county authority in 7 (b) and questioned 
whether there is a requirement related to cow numbers anywhere in Nutrient Management Plans 
outside of Ordinance # 90. Tr, p. 43 LS; Tr, p. 49-50. Apparently there is not 
The District Court held: "[T]hese above emphasized provisions unequivocally 
demonstrate the Legislature's intent for counties to regulate through their siting powers the 
number of animals at a CAFO, which expressed intent is the antithesis of full preemption." 
Court's Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement and Defendant's Motion to Strike 
Affidavits filed October 28, 2008, (R Vol 6, p.1183). 
4. Agriculture Odor Management Act 
According to the Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General's Opinion No. 08-01, 
published August 1, 2008, at pp. 8-9: 
In 2001 the Idaho Legislature enacted the Agriculture Odor Management Act, 
Idaho Code§§ 25-3801, et seq. (the "AOMA") Pursuant to the AOMA, DEQ 
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regulates odors from large swine and poultry operations, while odors from Beef 
CAFOs are regulated by ISDA under the BCEC Act. ISDA is also the lead 
agency from regulating odors from "operations where livestock or other 
agriculture animals are raised, or crops are grown, for commercial purposes, not to 
include [large swine and poultry operations and beef CAFOs]." Idaho Code§§ 25-
3801(3) and 25-3808(3) (Supp. 2007). 
The legislature's declaration of policy provides: 
(1) The agriculture industry is a vital component ofldaho' s economy and during 
the normal course of producing the food and fiber required by Idaho and our 
nation, odors are generated. It is the intent of the legislature to manage these 
odors when they are generated at a level in excess of those odors normally 
associated with accepted agricultural practices in Idaho. 
(3) .. .In carrying out the provisions of this chapter, the [ISDA] will make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that any requirements imposed upon agricultural 
operations are cost-effective and economically, environmentally and 
technologically feasible. 
Idaho Code§ 25-3801 (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). The ISDA director is 
authorized to promulgate agriculture odor rules. 
Pursuant to the AOMA, ISDA promulgated the Rules Governing Agriculture 
Odor Management, IDAPA 02.04.16.100, et seq. The Rules provide that 
management practices which are undertaken in accordance with the Rules 
Governing Dairy Waste; the Rules Governing Pesticide and Chemigation Use and 
Application; Rules Concerning Disposal of cull Onion and Potatoes; Rules 
Governing Dead Animal Movement and Disposal; the Idaho NRCS Nutrient 
Management Standard 590, June 1999; Best Management Practices listed in the 
"Idaho Agricultural Pollution Abatement Plan," August 2001; "Control of Manure 
Odors," ASAE Standard EP379.2 Section 5 and 6 in their entirety, November 
1997; and/or "Composting Facility," NRCS Conservation Practice Standard 317, 
March 2001; are considered accepted agricultural practices. [FNl] 
Despite the implementation of accepted agricultural practices, if an agricultural 
operation still generates odors in excess of those typically associated with that 
type of agriculture, the operation must develop and submit an odor management 
plan to ISDA. ISDA is further charged with reviewing and approving design 
plans for all new or modified liquid waste systems prior to construction. IDAP A 
02.04.16.300. The systems must be designed by a professional engineer. The 
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rules set forth general design standards, provide for inspections, and set forth the 
process and requirements for an odor management plan. 
ISDA must respond to all odor complaints lodged against agricultural operations, 
and handles violations of the Rules. 
2008 WL 3895659 pp. 8-9 (Idaho A.G.). 
In spite of the provisions of AOMA supra, the District Court noted that when siting a 
CAFO, in addition to concerns about manure addressed in Idaho Code 67-6529C, the LLUPA 
contemplates that local jurisdictions will address the odor considerations in Idaho Code 67-
6529D. Tr p. 23, LL 6-14. 
The District Court also noted that Idaho Code 67-6529D (3) provides: "This act does not 
preempt local regulation of a CAFO." Tr p. 23, LL 9-10. The CAFO operators acknowledge that 
setbacks are a traditional zoning function. Tr, p. 25, 12-5, but complain that Ordinance# 90 
does not allow CAFOs within one mile of rim of Snake River Canyon, Malad River Canyon and 
one half a mile of the zone A flood plain. Tr, p. 26. Why do setbacks exist if not for protection? 
It seems to be common sense, that there should be some distance between a sewer and a well for 
instance. Also, odors dissipate with distance. Do the smells of PocatelJo, Lewiston, or Jerome 
persist with distance? Who can honestly say they have driven past these locations without a 
recolJection of their distinct odors? 
5. The Beef Cattle Environmental Control Act 
The Beef Cattle Environmental Control Act, Idaho Code§§ 22-4901-- 22-4910. Idaho 
Code§ 22-4903 provides in pertinent part: "the director of the department of agriculture through 
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the division of animal industries is authorized to regulate beef cattle animal feeding operations to 
protect state natural resources, including surface water and ground water." Idaho Code§ 22-
4903 (2001). Idaho Code§ 22-4905 addresses "Design and Construction" but does not 
mention siting. The Beef Cattle Environmental Control Act has apparently never been construed 
in a published case with the LLUP A. 
6. Water Quality May Be Considered by Counties 
In Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 172 P.3d 1081 (2007) the 
Court considered whether Latah County acted without authority in enacting an ordinance and 
how that affected a decision on the award of attorney fees in a decision related to extractive 
mining. The Ralph Naylor Farms Court determined: 
While I.C. § 42-101 provides that control over the appropriation of water is vested 
in the State, there are also Idaho Code provisions which mandate that a local 
governing board consider the effect any proposed amendments to the 
comprehensive plan "would have on the source, quantity and quality of ground 
water in the area." I.C. § 67-6537. LC.§ 39-126, likewise, instructs any agency 
issuing a license which deals with the environment that it "shall take into account 
the effect the permitted or licensed activity will have on the ground water quality 
of the state .... 
Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806,810, 172 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2007). 
The Court in Ralph Naylor Farms, noted that regulating land use is "a power clearly 
reserved to the local governing boards in the LLUP A." Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah 
County, 144 Idaho 806,811, 172 P.3d 1081, 1086 (2007). Justice Jones, in dissent, while stating 
counties have no authority to regulate water quantity, agreed counties may participate in . 
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implementing policies with regard to water quality. Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 
144 Idaho 806, 813, 172 P.3d 1081, 1088 (2007) (Jones, J. dissenting). 
An examination of the purposes of Ordinance # 90 reveals that the BOCC acted in 
accordance with its explicit authority to consider water quality issues while carefully avoiding 
interference with State and Federal authority. (R Vol. 1, p. 20 - 22). Similarly, Ordinance# 90, 
Article VII C. entitled "Water Quality:" provides: 
All CAFO applicants must demonstrate that: 
1. The CAFO will be in compliance with the Clean Water Act and any relevant 
federal or state regulation implementing the Clean Water act in Idaho. 
2. There will not be discharge of pollutants into surface or ground water except as 
permitted by the appropriate state and/or federal agency with jurisdiction. A copy 
of any permit from any agency relative to discharge of pollutants must be filed 
with the Siting Permit file of the applicant. 
3. The CAFO owns adequate potable water rights to operate. This must be 
evidenced by a permit or license from the Idaho Department of Water Resources, 
or that the CAFO is in the process of obtaining the permit or license from the 
State of Idaho, in which case issuance of the siting permit will be contingent upon 
obtaining the appropriate permit or license. The Administrator will not issue a 
CAFO occupancy permit without written proof of an approved water right, or 
completed transfer from the IDWR. 
(R Vol. 1, p. 32.) 
None of Ordinance# 90's water quality provisions unlawfully conflict with state or 
federal provisions. Before the Court expands implied preemption Jaw and voids a large portion 
of the LLUPA, we would be wise to consider this from theAmeritel case: 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises 
free review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). The 
object of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. State v. 
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,475, 163 P.3d l 183, 1187 (2007) (citing Robinson v. 
Bateman-Hall Inc., 139 Idaho 207,210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003)). The literal 
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words of the statute provide the best guide to legislative intent, and therefore, the 
interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. Id. "In 
determining the ordinary meaning of a statute 'effect must be given to all the 
words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or 
redundant."' State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308,309 (2006) 
(quoting In re Winton Lumber Co., 57 Idaho 13 I, 136, 63 P.2d 664, 666 (1936)). 
Moreover, the Court must consider all sections of applicable statutes together to 
determine the intent of the legislature. Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 
Idaho 333,336,870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994). 
Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium or Community Center Dist., 146 Idaho 
202, 192 P.3d 1026(2008). 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a ruling on a summary judgement motion, this Court employs the 
same standard used by the district court. Sprinkler Irrigation Co. v. John Deere 
Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691,695, 85 P.3d 667,671 (2004). Smnmary judgement 
is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and. admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgement as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 
56( c ). This Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the non-
moving party and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by 
the record in favor of the party opposing the motion. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641,644 (2006). 
Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium or Community Center Dist., 146 Idaho 
202, 192 P.3d 1026(2008). 
A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation. Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, 141Idal1011, 14, 105 P.3d 671,674 (2004) (citations 
omitted). Ambiguity is not established merely because differing interpretations are presented to a 
court. Id. 
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C. CLAIMS OF THE CAFO OPERA TORS UNFOUNDED IN LAW OR FACT 
1. There Is No Implied Preemption under Envirosafe. 
The court in Envirosafe Services of Idaho, Inc. v. County of Owyhee, 735 P.2d 998, 112 
Idaho 687,689 (1987), in addressing the standard for implied preemption, held: 
The Idaho Constitution, art. 12, § 2, provides that county ordinances may not 
conflict with state statutes: § 2. Local police regulations authorized. Any county 
or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such 
local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or 
with the general laws. See also, In re Ridenbaugh, 5 Idaho 371, 49 P. 12 (1897). 
This grant of police power to local governments has been recognized and 
accorded respect by this Court: [A] municipality, under the constitutional 
provision in question, [art 12, § 2] has authority to make police regulations not in 
conflict with general laws, co-equal with the authority of the legislature to pass 
general police laws. Clyde Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 
505,512,210 P.2d 798,801 (1949). 
The concept of "conflict" broadens when put in the context of a determination of 
state preemption over a field of regulation. Of course, direct conflict ( expressly 
allowing what the state disallows, and vice versa) is "conflict" in any sense. State 
v. Musser, 67 Idaho 214, 176 P.2d 199 (1946). Additionally, a "conflict" between 
state and local regulation may be implied. This state firmly adopted the doctrine of 
implied preemption in Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 610 P.2d 517 (1980). 
Where it can be inferred from a state statute that the state has intended to fully 
occupy or preempt a particular area, to the exclusion of [local governmental 
entities], a [local] ordinance in that area will be held to be in conflict with the state 
law, even if the state law does not so specifically state. Caesar, supra, IO 1 Idaho 
at 161,610 P.2d at 520. (See also, United Tavern Owners of Philadelphia v. 
School District of Philadelphia, [441 Pa. 274]272 A.2d 868 (Pa.1971); Boyle v. 
Campbell, 450 S.W.2d 265 (Ky.1970); In re Hubbard, [62 Cal.2d 119, 396 P.2d 
809] (Cal.1964). 
The doctrine ofimplied preemption typically applies in instances where, despite 
the lack of specific language preempting regulation by local governmental entities, 
the state has acted in the area in such a pervasive manner that it must be assumed 
that it intended to occupy the entire field of regulation. 
"The [local governmental entity] cannot act in an area which is so completely 
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covered by general law as to indicate that it is a matter of state concern." Caesar, 
101 Idaho at 161,610 P.2d at 520. 
Envirosafe Services of Idaho, Inc. v. County of Owyhee, 735 P.2d 998, 112 Idaho 687,689 
(1987). 
a. The Legislature Has Manifested an Express Intent Not to Preempt the 
Field of CAFO Siting 
The Envirosafe court went on to distinguish those situations where there is a 
statutory intent not to preempt the field: 
In Clyde Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 9 Idaho 505,210 P.2d 798 
(1949), this Court acknowledged the ability of the legislature to implicitly 
preempt local regulation by occupying the field of regulation. In that case, we 
found that the legislature "did not intend to occupy the whole field of hours of sale 
of beer, thereby making any regulation by the county necessarily inconsistent with 
the general law." Clyde Hess, 69 Idaho at 510,210 P.2d at 800. Our failure to 
find the field preempted in Clyde Hess was due to the fact that express intent 
not to preempt was found in the same statute which had been alleged to 
preempt the field. (LC.§§ 23-1014-15). (See also, State v. Poynter, 70 Idaho 438, 
220 P.2d 386 (1950). 
Envirosafe Services of Idaho, Inc. v. County of Owyhee, 73 5 P .2d 998, 112 Idaho 687, 690 
(1987). 
The County is not preempted from enacting an ordinance regulating CAFOs. The CAFO 
operators, contend that the County, despite the legislature's clear command in Idaho Code§ 67° 
6529(2) is preempted from regulating CAFOs. Idaho Code§ 67-6529(2) providing in pertinent 
part that: 
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a board of county 
commissioners shall enact ordinances and resolutions to regulate the siting of 
large confined animal feeding operations and facilities, as they shall be defined 
by the board . .. including the approval or rejection of sites for the operations 
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and facilities . ... A board of county commissioners may reject a site regardless 
of the approval or rejection of the site by a state agency. 
Idaho Code§ 67-6529(2). 
b. Local Government Was Not Denigrated in Envirosafe. 
The court in Envirosafe Services of Idaho, Inc. v. County of Owyhee, 735 P.2d 998, 112 
Idaho 687,691 (1987) noted: 
We recognize the nnique importance of and benefit derived from local 
government regulation and that, ordinarily, local problems are best solved by local 
regulation, since local governmental entities are uniqnely suited to fashioning 
workable solutions by virtue of their proximity to, and direct awareness of, the 
issues involved. By our ruling here, we in no way denigrate the function of local 
government. 
Id at 691. 
c. There Are Not Just a Few Hazardous Waste Facilities as in 
Envirosafe; Instead, There Are Many Cattle and Many CAFO 
Operations 
While recognizing the value of local regulations, the Envirosafe Court found that 
hazardous waste sites lent themselves well to regulation by the state because of the very small 
number of hazardous waste sites in the state. According to the preamble of Ordinance# 90, the 
large number of cattle in Gooding County was one factor in the creation of Ordinance # 90. 
"[W)hereas the Idaho Agricultural statistics service estimated that there were 233,000 cattle and 
calves in Gooding County, which was the highest number of cattle and calves in any county in 
the State ofldaho[.]" R Vol 1, p. 20. 
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According to the record, Marv Patten's affidavit of26 June 2008 stated there were 
twenty-nine beef facilities and ninety-nine dairy producers in Gooding County. R Vol 3, p. 362-
363. These one hundred twenty-eight facilities in only one of!daho's counties are in stark 
contrast to the justification for preemption of local authorities in Envirosafe Services of Idaho, 
Inc. v. County of Owyhee, 735 P.2d 998, 112 Idaho 687,691 (1987) "the state of!daho is limited 
to very few facilities which handle hazardous waste." 
d. The Bulk of the County Ordinance in Envirosafe Replicated the State 
Statutes Hazardous Waste Management Act (HWMA) and the 
Federal Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) 
The court in Envirosafe Services of Idaho, Inc. v. County of Owyhee; 735 P.2d 
998, 112 Idaho 687, 691 (1987) noted: "the county itself concedes the bulk of Ordinance 
83-02 is entirely duplicative of the HWMA and, necessarily, the RCRA. Such extensive 
duplication leads to the inescapable conclusion that the area has already been fully 
regulated and the fields sought to be covered by the ordinance already occupied by the 
HWMA." In contrast, Ordinance #90 has different, and sometimes more stringent, 
controls and the CAFO operators are complaining because they are different. 
e. The Ordinance in Envirosafe Appeared to Be a Revenue Raising 
Measure 
The CAFO operators here are concerned that the County's Ordinance# 90 
imposes substantive requirements different and more restrictive than those 
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imposed by federal and state provisions. The CAFO operators nowhere raise a 
concern about fees or revenue raising measures. 
2. The Dormant Commerce Clause Argument Is a Red Herring Calculated to 
Add Confusion and Create Vagueness Where There Is None. 
At hearing on the motion for summary judgment counsel for CAFO opertators argued that 
provision VII D. 1 "The land base to support the animal units is required to be in Gooding county 
with the exception of contiguous land in an adjacent county," is an attempt by the County to keep 
manure in Gooding County. Tr, p. 20, L14 
CAFO operators dormant commerce clause claims appear to rest on a misreading, 
misinterpretation, and/or misunderstanding of Section VIL D. 1. of Ordinance #90. R Vol. I, 
p.32. The affidavits of Tom Faulkner and Paul Kroeger clearly state that Gooding County in no 
way intended to mandate the restrictions complained ofby CAFO operators. R Vol. 6 pp. 1149-
1151; R Vol. 6 pp. 1122-1148. The affidavit of Mr. Paul Kroeger, and the affidavit of Mr. Tom 
Faulkner, the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners, both having assisted in the 
drafting of the ordinance should be highly persuasive, if not dispositive as to the meaning of the 
ordinance provision purported by appellants to prohibit the shipping of manure. R Vol. 6 pp. 
1149-1151; R Vol. 6 pp. 1122-1148. CAFO operators may well state the law accurately, but 
Gooding County does not purport to restrict export of animal waste pursuant to approved 
Nutrient Management Plans. 
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At the hearing on the summary judgment motion, the attorney for the County agreed that 
Ordinance# 90 does not prohibit shipping manure out of the county. Transcript pages 17-19 & 
41; Tr, p. 19, L 11-12. Finally, at argument, counsel for the CAPO operators conceded that the 
dormant commerce clause argument went away. "Okay, Your Honor .... The interstate 
commerce clause argument then goes away ...• " Tr p.19, LL. 14-16. Generally, stipulations 
of parties or counsel made in pending proceedings are conclusive as to all matters properly 
contained therein. Stipulations are a form of judicial admission that obviates the necessity for 
proof of facts that are admitted in the stipulation. Reding v. Reding, 141 Idaho 369 
(2005)( citations omitted.). 
There is a strong presumption favoring the validity of the actions of zoning boards, which 
includes the application and interpretation of their own zoning ordinances .... Howard v. Canyon 
County Bd ofComm'rs, 128 Idaho 479,480,915 P.2d 709, 711 (1996). The Court defers to the 
Board's interpretation and application of its zoning ordinance, unless such interpretation or 
application is capricious, arbitrary or discriminatory. Rural Kootenai Organization, Inc. v. Board 
ofComm'rs, 133 Idaho 833,842,993 P.2d 596,605 (1999). Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 
Idaho 131, 133-134, 75 P.3d 185, 187-188 (2003) . 
. 
At the hearing on the Summary Judgement Motion the County attorney stated the 
county's position: "[The land base is] for the animal unit calculation." Tr. p. 18, L 2-3. The 
Court held the provision is a siting provision and does not restrict the application of manure to 
land in Gooding County. Tr, p. 17-19; Instead, this provision reflects the restriction of Gooding 
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County Commissioners' siting authority to property within the confines of Gooding County. Tr 
p. 19-20. The court held: '"land base' has nothing to do with prohibiting the removal from 
Gooding County of animal waste generated at a CAFO .... The phrase, 'The land base to support 
the animal units is required to be in Gooding County or contiguous land in an adjacent county,' 
simply means that only land in Gooding County or contiguous land in an adjacent county may be 
used by a CAFO applicant to calculate the maximum density of animals allowed on the CAFO 
located in Gooding County." Court's Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement and 
Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits filed October 28, 2008 ( R Vol. 6, p. 1187). 
D. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS 
Scott v. Gooding County; 137 Idaho 206, 46 P.3d 23 (Idaho 2002) states that the 
Adoption of a CAFO Ordinance is a legislative act. In order to challenge such an act, CAFO 
operators must establish that the passage of Ordinance #90 was arbitrary, capricious, or without a 
rational basis in fact. Spencer v. Kootenai County gives us some guidance: 
"The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states 
via the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process oflaw. U.S. Const. amend. V. This encompasses both procedural 
and substantive due process protections. In the context of legislation dealing with social or 
economic interests, the Court assumes a deferential review. See Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. 
v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 90, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (] 999). Jn this context substantive due process 
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requires that legislation which deprives a person of life, liberty, or property must have a rational 
basis. Id. That is, the statute must bear a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative 
objective. Id. The reason for the deprivation must not be so inadequate that it may be 
characterized as an arbitrary exercise of state police powers. Id." Spencer v. Kootenai County; 
145 Id 448, 180 P.3d 487 (Idaho 2008) 
Ordinance #90 allows for increased animal unit density, by variance, when certain 
conditions are met (VIL Variance, A-D). CAFO operators statement that Ordinance #90 does not 
contemplate new technologies and/or new methods of waste management is incorrect. 
Ordinance #90, Section V. sets forth the mandatory requirements of a application for a 
CAFO siting permit or modification. Section VI. sets forth the process by which the application 
is to be considered. R Vol. 1, p. 29. Section VII. sets forth criteria for approval. R Vol. 1, p. 31-
34. Section IX. requires that when granting or denying a siting permit the Board shall specify (1) 
the standards used in evaluating the application; (2) the reasons for the approval or the denial of 
the siting permit; and (3) the actions, if any that the applicant could take to obtain a permit. R 
Vol. 1, p. 34. The process built in to Ordinance# 90 conforms to the permit granting process set 
forth in Idaho Code§ 67-6519. 
The CAFO operators characterize their case as follows: "We're not challenging how the 
ordinance was adopted, that it was somehow arbitrary, how it was done. Nothing about the 
procedure. It's just about now as its enacted and taking the specific provisions and applying the 
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law. What's your decision about that." Tr, p. 6, L19-23. The CAFO operators' concerns are 
listed as: 
A request for declaratory relief through implied preemption by state law of specific 
provisions of Ordinace # 90 under the Envirosafe case. Tr p. 9, LL 1-18; Violation of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution because Ordinance # 90 
purportedly prohibits the transport of manure in violation of the interstate commerce clause. Tr 
p. 9, L 19-- p. 10, L. 9; and violation of due process because "various portions of the ordinance 
m·e arbitrary and capricious and do not have a rational basis ... to justify them." Tr p. I 0, L. I 0-
13. 
The CAFO operators challenge Section VII(D)(l) of Ordinance #90, which reads in 
pertinent part: "The approved maximum density of animals of animals shall not exceed five (5) 
animals per tillable, irrigated acre owned by the CAFO applicant. The land base to support the 
animal units is required to be in Gooding County with the exception of contiguous land in an 
adjacent county." R Vol. 1, p 32. The CAFO operators point to four provisions in Ordinance# 
90 Section VII.D.l. entitled "Property Rights." Tr p. 11, LL 16-17. 
I. A density cap of five animal units per acre.2 Tr p. 12, LL 13-15. 
2The way to figure animal units: The number of each type of animal times the animal 
equivalency factor would equal the animal unit. Then add all the equivalencies up to get the total 
combined number of animal units. The density cap of 5 animal units per acre is arrived at by 
using the animal unit worksheet to get the number of acres required for the nuruber of A.U.s. 
(See animal unit worksheet, in addendum, used to apply the animal type chart under II, C. of 
Ordinance# 90. R Vol. I, p. 4). 
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17. 
2. Requiring land ownership of the CAFO site by the CAFO operator. Tr p. 12, LL 16-
3. Land "to support the animal units must be in or contiguous to Gooding 
County." Tr p. 12, LL 18-19. 
4. "[O]nly tillable, irrigated acres are counted in the calculation used to determine 
animal densities." Tr p. 12, LL 21-23. Additionally, the CAFO operators also 
challenge Section VIll(D) of Ordinance #90, which reads: 
A variance may be sought to the requirements of Ordinance #90 to increase the 
animal density to a maximum of seven (7) animals per irrigated, tillable acre. 
Consideration will be given to such a variance if the CAFO operator employs 
multiple, proven, environmental technologies or methods to enhance or improve 
air, soil, and water quality including but not limited to methane or anaerobic 
digesters, berms with growing hedges and trees, etc. If approved, such a variance 
may be revoked if the CAFO operator discontinues the employment of the 
technology or method upon which the grant of the variance was based. 
R, Vol. 1, p 34. 
The District Court ruled that "Ordinance #90's establishment of a density cap for animals 
in Section VII(D)(l) of Ordinance #90 and by variance in Section VII(D) of Ordinance #90 is not 
arbitrary and without a rational basis" in the Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement 
and Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits, dated October 28, 2008, R, Vol. 6, p 1193-1195. 
The Court's order provided in pertinent part: 
The Plaintiffs set forth that to obtain a Siting Permit, a CAPO must 
provide a letter confirming approval of an NMP. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, 
36. Additionally, part of the NMP analysis is a determination of an appropriate 
animal density for a given applicant's CAFO operation. Id. The Plaintiffs allege 
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that Ordinance #90 ignores the scientific analysis that goes into a NMP' s animal 
density determination when the NMP may allow for more than five ( or seven 
under the variance) animals per acre, which makes the County's density cap 
arbitrary and without a rational basis. Id. 
The County points to the preamble or Ordinance #90 to establish the 
rational basis that was used to set the density cap for sections VII(D)(l) and the 
variance for the density cap in VII(D). See Defendant's Response, 9. 
Upon full review of the record, this Court determines that Ordinance #90's 
establislnnent of a density cap for animals is not arbitrary and without a rational 
basis. In viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, this 
Court concludes that the preamble of Ordinance #90 provides a rational basis for 
the density cap of animals of five (5) animals in Section VII(D)(l) and the 
variance that allows up to seven (7) animals in Section VII(D), and these sections 
are not arbitrary. While the preamble does set forth Nutrient Management factors, 
such as 88 percent of the fields sampled in Gooding County in 2006 exceeded the 
maximum allowable phosphorus levels as set by the Idaho Department of 
Agriculture and that animal densities of up to ten ( J 0) animals per acre has 
resulted in the over application of animal waste on existing agricultural land and 
that higher animal numbers and continued over application of animal waste has 
increased potential to contaminate both agriculture soil and water resources, the 
County also considered that there have been an increased number of complaints 
concerning contaminated wells, obnoxious odors, pests, dust and airborne 
contaminants. The Preamble reflects that in response to all of these findings and 
concerns that the ordinance would limit the further growth of animal numbers in 
Gooding County. All of these provisions in the preamble specifically go to the 
rational basis which the County had for setting the density cap and establish that 
Ordinance #90 is not wholly arbitrary and without a rational basis. See Faulkner 
Affidavit, paragraphs 4, 5, and 6. These provisions clearly provide "conceivable 
facts" which support the density cap provided in Sections VII(D)(J) and VJII(D) 
of Ordinance #90. 
The facts that NMP's contain density caps that are different and are set 
using a different system or criteria which the Plaintiff would prefer does not 
supersede the County's rational basis for enacting Ordinance #90. As set forth 
supra, NMPs only relate to the land application of animal waste. See LC. § 22-
4904(11 ). And, as is obvious from the language of the preamble and the Faulkner 
Affidavit, the County was not focused solely on the land application of the animal 
waste from CAFOs when creating Ordinance #90. The County clearly and 
reasonably considered additional factors, including both potential and historical 
problems and outcomes from CAFOs when creating the density cap in Section 
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VII(D)(l) and the variance for the density cap in Section VII(D). As such, the 
Plaintiffs have not negated every conceivable basis for Section VII(D)(l) and 
Section VII(D) of Ordinance #90, and thus these sections are not arbitrary and 
without a rational basis as a matter of law. 
Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement and Defendant's Motion to Strike 
Affidavits, dated October 28, 2008, R, Vol. 6, pp 1193-1195. 
The District Court mled that the "challenge to Section VII(D)(l)'s requirements that the 
land base must be in Gooding County with the exception of contiguous land in an adjacent 
county as being arbitrary and without a rational basis is based on a misreading of the language of 
Section VII(D)(l) by the Plaintiffs" in the Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement 
and Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits, dated October 28, 2008, R, Vol. 6, p 1195-1196. 
The Court's order provided in pertinent part: 
The Plaintiffs contend that Section VII(D)(l ), in requiring that the land 
base to support the animal units of a CAFO be in Gooding County with the 
exception of contiguous land in an adjacent county, is arbitrary and without a 
rational basis. Again, the Plaintiffs come to this conclusion by reading the term, 
"land base," to mean the animal waste generated at a CAFO. With this reading of 
"land base," the Plaintiffs come to the conclusion that "this provision will 
exacerbate the risk of water resource contamination ... Keeping all animal waste 
generated by Gooding County CAFO's in the County and mandating its direct 
land application to an insufficient number of acres is not a rational method of 
preventing contamination of water resources." See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, 34-
35. 
As noted supra, the Plaintiffs' interpretation of "land base" under Section 
VII(D)(l) of Ordinance #90 is incorrect. The term, "land base," as used in 
Section VII(D)(l) of Ordinance #90 is not based upon the disposal of animal 
waste. Again, Section VII(D)(l) simply deals with calculating the density of 
animals per acre - how many animals are allowed per acre and what land can be 
used for the calculation. Because the Plaintiffs' argument on this section is based 
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on an incorrect reading of the language of Section VII(D)( I), the challenge is 
denied. 
Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement and Defendant's Motion to Strike 
Affidavits, dated October 28, 2008, R, Vol. 6, p 1195-1196. 
The District Court ruled that "Ordinance #90's requirement in Section VII(D)(l) that land 
used for a CAFO must be owned by the CAFO applicant is not arbitrary and without a rational 
basis" in the Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement and Defendant's Motion to 
Strike Affidavits, dated October 28, 2008, R, Vol. 6, pp 1196-1 I 98. The Court's order provided 
in pertinent part: 
The Plaintiffs argue that the requirement in Section VII(D)(l) that the CAFO land 
used to determine the animal density must be "owned" by the CAFO applicant is 
arbitrary and without a rational basis. In their Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgement, the Plaintiffs state that Section 
VII(D)(l) "also provides that animal waste may only be applied to land owned by 
CAFO owners and operators." See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, 33. In reading · 
Section VII(D)(l) of Ordinance #90, it is clear that the Plaintiffs' assertion is not a 
correct reading. Section VII(D)(l) requires that "the approved maximum density 
of animals shall not exceed five (5) animal units per tillable, irrigated acre owned 
by the CAFO applicant." (Emphasis added). This section clearly does not state 
that animal waste may only be applied to land owned by CAFO owners and 
operators. Instead, the clear meaning of this section is that only land owned by the 
CAFO applicant may be used in calculating the animal density for the CAFO; that 
is, the total number of permitted animals at a particular site in dependant on the 
amount of land owned in the County. 
At oral argument the Plaintiffs additionally challenged Section VII(D)(l) 
of Ordinance #90 in asserting that the requirement that the land used for 
calculating the animal density must be owned by the CAFO applicant and not 
simply leased by the CAFO applicant is arbitrary and without a rational basis. At 
oral argument, the County responded that the rational basis for this portion of 
Section VII(D)(l) was to prevent lessees ofland who are operating a CAFO from 
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violating their lease and thus being w1able to use the previously leased land in the 
density calculation. 
Upon full review of the record and in viewing the facts most favorably to 
the non-moving party, this Court determines that the requirement that land used in 
the calculation for animal density at a CAFO must be owned by the CAFO 
applicant is not arbitrary and without a rational basis. This Court can readily 
identify at least two reasons why this requirement has a rational basis. First, the 
requirement that the land be owned by the CAFO applicant protects from the 
possibility of the CAFO applicant combining owned land together with leased 
land as a basis for the calculation of the animal density, which could lead to the 
animal density being established without further legal right to the land which was 
used for the calculation of the animal density in the first place. Second, enforcing 
CAFO permit requirements/violations against one holding only a leasehold 
interest can become far more problematic to the County. The requirement that the 
land used to calculate the density be owned by the applicant prevents nnwanted 
results in a variety of potential circwnstances, including the above two. Thus, the 
Plaintiffs have not negated every conceivable basis for this portion of Section 
VII(DO(l) of Ordinance #90, and thus the requirement that the land used for 
calculating animal density must be owned by the CAFO applicant is not arbitrary 
and without a rational basis. 
Order on Plaintiff's Motion for SW11mary Judgement and Defendant's Motion to Strike 
Affidavits, dated October 28, 2008, R, Vol. 6, pp 1198-1199. Problems between, and 
surronnding, absentee landlords, and tenants out of control are no novelties. See generally the 
parable of the tenant taught by Jesus. The Bible, Matthew 21: 33-41; Mark 12: 1-9; Luke 20: 9-
16. 
The District Court ruled that "the requirement of Section VII(D)(l) of Ordinance #90 that 
land must be tillable and irrigated to be used in the calculation of animal density is not arbitrary 
and without a rational basis" in the Order on Plaintiffs Motion for S=ary Judgement and 
THE COUNTY'S BRlEF -28-
Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits, dated October 28, 2008, R, Vol. 6, pp 1198-1199. The 
Comt's order provided in pertinent part: 
The Plaintiffs next assert that the requirement in Section VII(D)(l) of 
Ordinance #90 that the animal density is calculated only by tillable, irrigated acre 
is arbitrary and without a rational basis. The Plaintiffs assert that this section is 
"not reasonably related to Gooding County's stated objectives for enacting the 
Ordinance and are wholly arbitrary." Plaintiff's Memorandum, 33. Furthermore, 
the Plaintiffs state that "the Ordinance is ... arbitrary in that it does not consider 
the total acreage a CAFO operator owns, and instead limits the inquiry to 'tillable, 
irrigated acre[s]." Id. at 37. At oral argument, the Plaintiffs further argued that 
this section was arbitrary and without a rational basis because not all CAFOs 
directly land apply their animal waste, but in fact, some CAFOs don't directly 
lru1d apply their ru1imal waste at all. 
The County points to the preamble of Ordinance #90 to establish the 
rational basis which was used to establish the requirement that only tillable, 
irrigated lru1d is used to set the density cap for animals in Sections VII(D)(l) and 
the variru1ce for the density cap inVII(D). See Defendant's Response, 9. 
Upon full review of the record ru1d in viewing the facts 
most favorably to the non-moving party, this Court determines that the 
requirement that land used in the calculation for ru1imal density at a 
CAFO must be tillable ru1d irrigated by the CAFO applicru1t is not 
arbitrary ru1d without a rational basis. · This requirement, in part, 
protects from over-application of ru1imal waste on land, which is a 
direct concern of the County, as set forth in the Preamble to 
Ordinru1ce #90. More importru1tly, in requires the use oflru1d 
which can grow crops which will "uptake" or use some of the 
ru1imal waste nutrients. Additionally, specific geological features, 
such as water courses, fissures in rock, solid rock ru1d/or steep 
grades, are not conducive to keeping the waste contained or on the 
CAFO site and/or not as likely to properly absorb the waste. This 
"tillable, irrigable" requirement also ensures that acreage 
consumed by homesteads, ditches, roads, corrals, milking barns, 
feed storage, etc., are not considered in the calculation for the 
ru1imal density. Suffice it to say, the ordinru1ce must be read in its 
entirety ru1d each of these challenged provisions must be put in 
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context to the entire ordinance. When examined in such a fashion, 
each has a rational basis. Thus, there are "conceivable facts" as to 
support this portion of Ordinance #90, and the Plaintiffs have not 
negated every conceivable basis for this requirement. In 
conclusion, the requirement of Section VII(D)(l) of Ordinance #90 
that the density of animals is established only by tillable, irrigated 
acres is not wholly arbitrary and without a rational basis. 
Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement and Defendant's Motion to Strike 
Affidavits, dated October 28, 2008, R, Vol. 6, pp 1198-1199. 
The preamble to Ordinance #90 includes multiple statements concerning the basis for 
enactment. Each of these statements contributes to a clear conclusion that provisions of 
Ordinance #90 were based on the applicable law, based on public input, well thought out, and 
well reasoned. In short, fairly well the opposite of what the CAFO operators are claiming. 
Ordinance #90 is not arbitrary, capricious, and/or without rational basis merely because CAFO 
operators say it is. To the contrary, a rational basis is set forth and that basis is adequate to show 
that Ordinance #90 bears a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective. 
E. LOCAL INTERESTS MUST BE PROTECTED AND GOODING COUNTY IS NOT 
AN ENEMY OF THE CAFO OPERATORS BUT WILL REQUIRE THAT THE 
INDUSTRY IS A GOOD NEIGHBOR TO GOODING COUNTY'S OTHER CITIZENS. 
The Envirosafe case relied on by CAFO operators can be readily distinguished. The 
statutory scheme before the Court is a specific grant of the elected legislature of the State of 
Idaho to local governments. CAFO operators point to no statute which expressly prohibits the 
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regulation complained of. The CAFO operators rely on a plethora of extra-legislative 
documents, and not on specific legislative grants of authority to any State agency. 
CAFO operators ask the Court to obviate the specific, clearly stated intent of the 
legislature expressed in the LLUP A. The actual legislative enactments relied on by CAFO 
operators do not rise to the level required to impliedly preempt a County's exercise of the police 
power granted by the Idaho Constitution and the Idaho legislature. 
Before this Court guts the provisions so carefully installed in the LLUP A the Court 
should consider that this point on the planet is known best, and cared most about, by th~e living 
here, Gooding County Citizens. Co~ty leaders and Gooding County citizens may be forgiven 
for looking askance at the prospect of trusting officials from Boise and Washington D.C. to look 
out for their interests. Agriculture is not odious to Gooding. The concept of competing 
agricultural interests is not new and strange to citizens of the County; see the accounts of water 
disputes and the sheep, horse, and cattle disputes and the competition for scarce resources. R 
Vol. 6, p. I 052-1062. Agriculture is the County's life blood. Locals must have a place at the 
table and county government is it. 
The CAFO operators' concerns seem no different from the citizens that make a living by 
driving. There are Federal, State, County and City roadways and local authorities pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 49-208 exercise local police power to address local concerns within the rubric of 
authority exercised by other entities. It is workable. 
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F. WHETHER THE COUNTY IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
UNDER I.A. R. 41, IDAHO CODE§ 12-117, AND IDAHO CODE§ 12-121. 
In this matter the CAPO operators have claimed the County is preempted from enacting 
an ordinance regulating CAFOs despite the legislature's clear command in Idaho Code§ 67-
6529(2) providing iu pertinent part that: 
Notwithstanding any provision oflaw to the contrary, a board of county 
commissioners shall enact ordinances and resolutions to regulate the siting of 
large confined animal feeding operations and facilities, as they shall be defined 
by the board . .. including the approval or rejection of sites for the operations 
and facilities. . . . A board of county commissioners may reject a site regardless 
of the approval or rejection of the site by a state agency. 
Idaho Code § 67-6529(2). 
The court in Chisholm v. Idaho Dept. Of Water Resources, 125 P.3d 515,521, 142 Idaho 
159, 165 (2005) held: 
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides that in an administrative or civil judicial 
proceedings against a state agency, a county, or a city the court may award 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party if the opposing party acted without 
a reasonable basis in fact or law. LC. § 12-117. 
Chisholm v. Idaho Dept. Of Water Resources, 125 P.3d 515,521, 142 Idaho 159, 165 (2005). 
Idaho Code § 12-117 (I) provides in pertinent part: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial 
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other 
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the 
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. 
Idaho Code§ 12-117 (1). 
THE COUNTY'S BRIEF -32-
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides in pertinent part that "[i]n any civil action, the judge may 
award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party." The CAFO operators have proceeded 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Further, the CAPO operators' Dormant Commerce 
Clause argument is frivolous, unreasonable and without basis in law or fact. The County 
requests that in the event the County prevails this Court will award attorney fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The CAFO operators' Motion for Summary Judgment was without merit. Further, the 
CAPO operators' appeal is without merit and should in all respects be denied, and the CAPO 
operators should take nothing thereby. 
DATED this '2,0 day of May, 2009. 
~~~ 
Luverne E. Shull, Chief Deputy 
DATED this .Jl)day of May, 2009. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
IDAHO DAIRY ASSOCIATION, INC., 
AN IDAHO NON-PROFIT CORPORATION; 
THE IDAHO CATTLE ASSOCIATION, INC., 
AN IDAHO NON-PROFIT CORPORATION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GOODING COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, a body politic 
and corporate of the State ofidaho 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV-2007-0000651 
MOTION TO DISMISS · 
LR.C.P. 12 
Fee Category: Exempt, I. C. 3 1-3 212 
Comes now Defendant and moves this Court for an Order Dismissing Plaintiffs 
complaint on any one or all of the following bases: 
MOTION TO DISMISS -1-
'V 
~ 
Failure to Join an Indispensable Party 
10-1211. PARTIES TO ACTION -- MUNICIPAL ORDER OR FRANCillSE. When declaratory 
relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be 
affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to 
the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or 
franchise, such municipality shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if the 
statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney general of the state 
shall also be served, and be entitled to be heard and may intervene. 
1. All persons who have any interest or claim which would be affected by a Declaratory 
Judgment, or whose rights may be prejudiced by a Declaratory Judgment, have not been made 
parties to this action pursuant to Idaho Code section 10~ 1211. 
2. Plaintiffs have plead on behalf of every member of their organizations, particularly 
each and every member situated in Gooding County, Idaho.· 
3. Gooding County Ordinance 90 does afford protections concerning the health, safety, 
and welfare of all Gooding County Citizens. 
4. The breadth with which Plaintiffs have plead this matter requires service on every 
person who resides in proximity to a Gooding County CAFO. 
5. Each of these persons who would be affected by reduction/elimination of setbacks, 
increased/unlimited animal units per acre, and/or any other Declaration reducing or eliminating 
the protections afforded by Gooding County Ordinance 90 are indispensable parties to this 
lawsuit. 
6. Defendant is without the ability to specifically identify the names of these citizens, as 
Defendant is not privy to Plaintiffs Gooding County membership roles. 
7. Plaintiffs have their membership information, and must make parties of all persons as 
required by Idaho Code. 
MOTION TO DISMISS -2-
Failure to State a claim upon which Relief may be granted 
1. I.R.C.P. 9(b) requires that any violation of civil or constitutional rights be plead with 
particularity. 
2. Plaintiffs have alleged violations of civil and constitutional rights. 
3. Plaintiffs have failed to allege these supposed violations with particularity. 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
Failure to State a claim upon which Relief may be granted 
1. Plaintiffs allegations fail to identify any CAFO application that has been filed, that is 
pending, or that has been processed pursuant to Gooding County Ordinance 90. 
2. No identifiable member of Plaintiffs organizations has been prejudiced by the 
provisions of Ordinance 90. 
3. Any decision by this Court as requested by plaintiffs, would be grossly and 
prejudicially speculative, requiring a decision based on conjecture and not fact. 
4. The matters brought forward by plaintiffs are not ripe for judicial determination, and 
do not present a currently justiciable issue. 
5. Any judgment as prayed for by Plaintiffs would not terminate any uncertainty or 
controversy as alleged by Plaintiffs. 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
Failure to State a claim upon which Relief may be granted 
l. Plaintiffs fail to adequately address the authority granted Counties by the Local Land 
Use Planning Act, Idaho Code sections 67-6501 et seq .. 
2. Idaho Code does grant Counties the authority to regulate the siting of certain animal 
operations and facilities.(I.C. 67-6529 et seq.). 
3. Plaintiffs have failed to allege with particularity the violations of civil and 
constitutional rights which must flow from the State's grant of authority to Counties in order for 
Plaintiffs to prevail. 
MOTION TO DISMISS -3-
Res Judicata - State Preemption and County Authority 
1. District Judge John K. Butler, in a decision dated May l 0, 2007, decided the issue of 
State preemption in regard to Dairy management and the disposition of Dairy waste. In Re: 
Edward Rosa dba R&R Holsteins vs. Gooding County et al., Gooding County Case Number CV-
2006-749. Judge Butler's decision resolved one of the precise issues before this Court. The case 
did involve Edward Rosa, who to Defendant's knowledge is a member of at least one of the 
Plaintiff organizations. The parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue prior to 
Judge Butler's decision. Judge Butler's decision is res judicata as to that issue in this. case, and 
resolved the issue in favor of Gooding County. 
2. In addition, Judge Butler's decision addressed the authority ofldaho Cotmties to 
regulate the siting of certain animal operations, the central issue in this matter. Again Judge 
Butler's decision is res judicata in this case, and the issue was resolved in favor of Gooding 
County. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant requests that Plaintiffs complaint be dismissed and 
that Plaintiff take nothing thereby. 
Oral argument is requested, either prior to or in conjunction with trial of this matter. 
Defendant will set this matter for hearing after consultation with the Court and counsel. 
Dated this lit-day of December, 2007. 
MOTION TO DISMISS -4-
Calvin H. Campbell, · 
Gooding County Prosecutor 
L. Horgan, 
ivil Deputy Prosecutor 
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Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
MOTION TO DISMISS -5-
personal delivery 
~US.Mail 
__ telephone facsimile 
fax# 208-388-1300 
) ') 
" 'DISTRICT COURT (iOODINCi en. !DAHO 
FILED 
2UOHIAY l I i\M 9: I 3 
GOO[)iNG COUNTY CLER!\ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL ~i~TRI~E 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 





ft. ) Case No. CV-2006-749 
) 
GOODING COUNTY, a Political ) 
Subdivision of the State of Idaho, HELEN ) 
EDWARDS, ROBERT MORGADO and ) 
TOM FAULKNER, Members of the ) 






Judith Stockham, ) 
) 
Intervenor. ) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The petitioner, Edward Rosa dba R & R Holsteins (Rosa), seeks Judicial Review of the 
Gooding County Board of Commissioners' (Board) Findings of Fact and Decision, dated 
September 26, 2006, denying its application for a new CAFO permit. Oral argument was held 
on April 24, 2007. Counsel John B. Lothspeich appeared on behalf of the Petitioner, Gooding 
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County Deputy Prosecutor Paul R. Kroeger appeared on behalf of the Respondents and Counsel 
Joseph F. James appeared on behalf of the intervenor, Judith Stockham. 
I. 
PROCEDURAL IDSTORY AND BACKGROUND 
On February 15, 2006, Rosa applied for a new CAPO siting permit for 3,199 total 
combined animal units on 320 acres located in the NW¼ of Section 11 & NW¼ of Section 14, 
Township 6 Sblith, Range 15 E.B.M. The property in question Is toned agricultural and is 
bordered by desert on the south, east and west sides of the site. To the north and north we;t of 
· the site, the land use is generally farm ground with numerous residential sites. The site is within 
a mile of Highway 26 which runs east and west and access to the site from Highway 26 would be 
the 2100 East Road to the 2000 South Road. 
On April 24 and May 1, 2006, a public hearing was conducted on the application for the 
CAPO pemiit by the Gooding County Planning and Zoning · Commission (Commission). 
(Exhibit Bl). The ·commission, on May 1, 2006, voted to de~y the Rosa application. The 
Conunission then issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on May 8, 2006 denying 
the Rosa application for a new CAPO permit. (R. pg. 150-159). 
On May 23, 2006, Rosa appealed the Commission's denial of its application for a new 
CAFO permit to the Gooding County Board of Conunissioners. Proper notice was published of 
a public hearing on the appeal and a public hearing was conducted before the Board on July 24, 
2006. (Exhibit B2). The Board then held a public discussion of the Rosa appeal at its meeting of 
August 28, 2006 (Exhibit B3) and voted to uphold the denial of the Rosa application by the 
Conunission with Conunissioner Faulkner abstaining. On September 25, 2006, the Board issued 
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) 
its written Findings of Fact and Decision denying the Rosa application for a new CAFO permit. 
(Exhibit A). 
On October 19, 2006, the petitioner, Rosa, filed a timely Petition for Judicial Review. 
II. 
ISSUES ON REVIEW 
The following issues have been presented by the petitioner for judicial review: 
I. · Whether the Board, in il.e~ying the :Rosa application, violated Idaho. Code § 67-6519; 67-
6535; or 67-5279. 
2. Whether the Board inappropriately applied factors which were subject to the Doctrine of 
Applied Preemption. 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003), 
has clearly set forth the standard of r~view for judicial review of the Local Land Use Planning 
Act (LLUPA) as follows: 
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUP A) allows an affected person to 
seek judicial review of an approval or denial of a land use application, as provided 
for in the Idaho Administrative Procedural Act (IDAPA). Idaho Code § 67-
652l(l)(d) (2002); Evans v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 
430, 50 P.3d 443, 445 (2002). The district court conducts judicial review of the 
actions oflocal government agencies. I.R.C.P. 84(a)(l) (2002). For purposes of 
judicial· review of LLUP A decisions, a local agency making a land use decision, 
such as the Board of Commissioners, is treated as a government agency under 
IDAPA. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000). 
The district court bases its judicial review on the record created before the local 
government agency. I.R.C.P. 84(e)(l). This Court reviews decisions under the 
IDAPA independently of any intermediate appellate court. Evans, 137 Idaho at 
431, 50 P.3d at 446. 
This Court must affirm the Board of Commissioners unless it determines 
the Board of Commissioners' findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (1) 
violated the constitution or statutory provisions; (2) exceeded its statutory 
authority; (3) were made upon unlawful procedure; (4) were not supported by 
substantial evidence on the record; or ( 5) were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse 
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of discretion. Id.; I.C. § 67-5279(3). There is a strong presumption that the 
actions of the Board of Commissioners, \Vhere it has interpreted and applied its 
own zoning ordinances, are valid. Evans, 137 Idaho at 431, 50 P.3d at 446. The 
party appealing the Board of Commissioners' decision m1.1st first show the Board 
of Commissioners erred in a manner specified under LC. § 67-5279(3), and 
second, that a substantial right has been prejudiced. I.C. § 67-5279(4); Price v. 
Payette County Bd. ofComm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583,586 (1998). 
Whether the Board of Commissioners violated a statutory provision is a 
matter of law over which this Court exercises free review. Friends of Farm to 
Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196, 46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002);. Polk v. 
Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 308, 17 P.3d 247,252 (2000). 
This Court defers to the Board of Commissioners' findings of fact unless 
the findings of fact are clearly erroneous.' Evans; 137 Idalio at 431, 50 P.3d at 
446; Frfends of Farin to Market, 137 Idaho atl96; 46 P.3d at 13. The Board of 
Commissioners' factual findings are not clearly erroneous so long as they are 
supported by substantial, competent, although conflicting, evidence. Friends of 
Farm to Market, 137 Idaho at 196, 46 P.3d at 13. 
Id. at 74-75, 73 P.3d at 87-88. 
Agen~y action is "capricious if it is done without a rational basis" and "arbitrary if it was 
done in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining 
principles." American Lung Ass'n, etc. v. State, Dep't of Agriculture, 142Jdaho 544, 547, 130 
P .3d 1082, 1085 (2006). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The Regulation of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO) 
The Idaho legislature enacted certain statutes which permitted counties to regulate the 
siting of certain animal operations. I.C. §§ 67-6529; 67-6529A O 67-6529G. Particularly, section 
67-6529 provides as follows: 
67-6529. Applicability to agricultural land--Counties may regulate 
siting of certain animal operations and facilities. 
(1) No power granted hereby shall be construed to empower a board of 
county commissioners to enact any ordinance or resolution which deprives any 
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owner of full and complete use of agricultural land for production of any 
agricultural product. Agricultural land sh.all be defmed by local ordinance or 
resolution. · 
(2) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a board of 
county commissioners shall enact ordinances and resolutions to regulate the siting 
of large confined animal feeding operations and facilities, as they shall be defmed 
by the board, provided however, that the definition of a confined animal feeding 
operation shall not be less restrictive than the definition contained in section 67-
6529C, Idaho Code, including the approval or rejection of sites for the operations 
and facilities. At a minimum, a county's ordinance or resolution shall provide that 
the board of county con:u:nissioners shall hold at least one (1) public hearing 
affording the j:mblic ari opportunity to c6riunent On. each proposed site ·before the 
siting 6fsuch facility. Several Sites may be considered at any one (1) public 
hearfog. Only members of the public with their primary residencewithin a one (1) 
mile radius of a proposed site may provide comment at the hearing. However, this 
distance may be increased by the board. A record of each hearing and comments 
received shall be made by the board. The comments shall be duly considered by 
the board when deciding whether to approve or reject a proposed site. A board of 
county commissioners may reject a site regardless of the approval or rejection of 
the site by a state agency. 
Section 67-6529 is to be read in coritext with the Local Planning Act and in accordance 
with the · goals and purpOses as· set forth in the provisions of·§ •· 67-6502. While ari owner of 
agricultural land is not to be deprived of the "full and complete use of agricultural lands for 
production of any agricultural product," it is not intended that they are to have a "carte blanc 
exemption" from all county zoning ordinances. Olsen v. Ada County, 105 Idaho 18, 665 P.2d 
717 (1983). 
It is clear that a county must enact ordinances to regulate the siting of CAFO' s; that the 
county definition of a CAFO may not be less restrictive than the definition contained in section 
67-6529C; that the Board conduct at least one (1) public hearing to afford the public the ability 
to comment on the proposed site; that those of the public within one mile of the proposed site 
have the right to make comment at the public hearing unless such distance is increased by the 
Board; that the public comment must be considered by the Board in rejecting or approving the 
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site; and that the Board may reject or approve the site regardless of the approval or rejection of 
the site by a state agency. 
On July 8, 2003, Gooding County adopted Ordinance No. 77 pursuant to the authority of 
section 67-6529. Section VII of the ordinance sets forth the mandatory contents of an 
application for a siting permit in order for the application to be considered. Section VIII of the 
ordinance sets forth the process by which the application is to be considered. Section IX of the 
ordinance sets forth the Criteria for the Approval of a siting permit. Section X of the ordmance 
requires· that when granting or denying a siting permit the Board shall specify the (1) standards 
used in evaluating the application; (2) the reasons for the approval or denial of the siting permit; 
and (3) the actions, if any, that the applicant could take to obtain a permit. These provisions are 
consistent with the permit granting process set forth in J.C. § 67-6519. 
When the Board makes a determination as to whether to grant or deny a siting permit the 
final order must include "a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards considered 
relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon and explains the rational for the decision . 
. . . " LC. §67-6535(b). Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 07.7 ISCR 313 (2007). 
B. Did the Board Violate the Provisions ofI.C. 67-5279? 
It is the contention of the petitioner that the Board "sought to deny the permit for any 
basis whatsoever and that the legal or factual basis for the denial of the CAFO permit were 
nonexistent under the provisions of Ordinance No. 77." It is the further contention of the 
petitioner that the Board focused on factors that were irrelevant to the Criteria for Approval set 
forth in Section IX of the ordinance and that the Board failed to follow its own standards and 
criteria for approval or rejection of the siting permit. 
1. Did the Board's Findings of Fact and Decision comply with I.C. § 67-6535? 
6 - MEMORANDUM DECISION ON JUDICIAL REVIEW rr···· 
) 
From a review of the record, it would appear that the Board was satisfied that the 
petitioner had complied with the Criteria For Approval of the siting permit, with the exception of 
IX.B.8. as it related to the "Site Limitations Rating Criteria for Land-Applied Wastewater." The 
record demonstrated that, of the IO factors evaluated, the two factors of "Organic Matter" and 
"Limiting Layer Depth" each had a severe rating. In the event that any of the 10 factors had a 
"severe or very severe" rating, it would then be the requirement of the applicant to "have a 
detailed environmental plan setting forth how this factor will be resolved .. : ;" 
The Board, in its findings of fact at paragraph 4; found that the criteria for approval. had 
not been met as to section IX.B.8. because of the severe ratings mentioned above and the Board 
merely recited portions of what was stated in the NRCS letter (Exhibit #13). However, the 
portions of the NRCS letter relied upon are relevant only to the issue of "organic matter" and do 
' 
not address the issue of the "limiting layer depth." The Board made no express finding or 
conclusion as to whether an environmental plan had been submitted that would resolve this 
concern. A review of the record would demonstrate that, in the NRCS letter (Exhibit #13) it was 
stated that: 
The presence of well drained soils and limited depth requires proper application 
management to balance the application rate with the holding capacity and plant 
uptake, reducing the opportunity of leaching to the shallow bedrock. Application 
following a comprehensive nutrient management plan will minimize 
environmental impact related to these existing conditions. 
The Site Advisory Team Report (R. pg 10), also stated: 
Groundwater may be susceptible to contamination due to shallow soil depth and 
the underlying fractured basalt geology. This susceptibility can be mitigated by 
ensuring the facility is designed correctly and wastewater and irrigation water 
management is effective. 
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The record also demonstrates that the petitioner did submit plans dealing with the 
management of!and-applied wastewater, including a Nutrient Management Plan (Exhibits #11 .& 
6), yet there is no comment in the findings of fact or the record itself for this court to determine if 
the Board was satisfied or not that such plans would resolve the environmental concerns. 
Most recently the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the adequacy of fmdings of fact and 
conclusions of law for purposes of judicial review. Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City of 
Sun Valley, 07.7ISCR 313 (2007). While the court in its decision: was addressing the provisions 
of I.C. § 67-5248(1)(a), the reasoning has similar application to § 67-'6535. When the B~ard 
made its decision to deny the siting permit, it must be based on "standards and criteria" set forth 
in the Ordinance and the approval or denial of the siting permit must be in writing and 
"accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and · standards considered 
relevant, states the relevant contested facts, and explains the rationale for the decision .... " LC. 
§ 67-6535 (a)&(b ). 
As was the case in Crown Point, the Board and the Commission have failed to make 
adequate fmdings of fact, and instead, the Board's "'findings' merely recite portions of the 
record" or "a recitation of testimony given in the record." As the court in Crown Point stated: 
By reciting testimony, a court or agency does not find a fact unless the testimony 
is unrebutted in which case the court or agency should so state. "A finding of fact 
is a determination of a fact by the court [ or agency), which fact is averred by one 
party and denied by the other and this determination must be founded on the 
evidence in the case." C.J.T. Corp. v. Elliott, 66 Idaho 384, 397, 159 P.2d 891, 
897 (1945) (internal quotations and citation omitted). indeed, nothing listed 
under Finding 7 can be said to be a factual finding made by the City. The 
"fmdings of fact" do not determine any facts; they are only recitations of evidence 
which could be used to support a finding without an affirmative statement that the 
agency is fmding the fact testified to. Id. 07. 7 ISCR at 315. 
In Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 80-81, 73 P.3d 84, 93-94 (2003), the court 
indicated that the Board, in issuing its written decision, may adopt the findings and conclusions 
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of the Commission, and does not necessarily have to issue its own findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, however, the findings and conclusions of the commission, if so adopted, 
would necessarily have to comply with the provisions of § 67-6535. The findings of the 
Commission in its original denial are in essence no different from those of the Board (R. 150-
159). Both the Board and the Commission merely came to the conclusion that the Site 
Limitations Rating Criteria for Land-Applied Wastewater was not met without making any 
factual findings as to 'whether there was an environmental plan to resolve the. rating boncems 
. ancl/orwhether the environmental plan>was adequate. 
The Board, :in the adoption of Ordinance #77, has set forth the criteria for approval of the 
siting pertnit for a CAFO. It is clear that Board must specify the "standards and criteria" used in 
rejecting or a~cepting the permit. LC. §67-6519(4); 67-6535(b). Where a factual dispute exist as 
to a particular criteria for approval, it is the obligation of the Board to make appropriate findings 
. . . ' 
of fact upon which to conclude that the criteria has or has not· been met under the terms of its 
ordinance and §67-6535. It would appear from the record of the proceedings of the Co~ission 
and the Board that it is undisputed that the petitioner met the criteria for approval of his siting 
permit except as to the Site Limitations Rating Criteria for Land-Applied Wastewater which 
admittedly had two severe ratings which required the petitioner to submit a "detailed 
environmental plan setting forth how this factor will be resolved." (Section IX.B.8., Ordinance 
#77). The Board, in their Brief, argues that the Board and Commission "impliedly determined 
the Nutrient Management Plan" was not such an environmental plan. Based on a review of the 
record and the written findings of the Board and the Commission, that does not appear to be the 
case. The members of the Commission indicated on the record its belief that no enviromnental 
plan had been presented to address the issue of the "Limiting Layer Depth" and the Board did 
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not discuss this issue at all on th<:; record and merely adopted the findings of the Commission.· It 
is for the Board to determine if the plan as submitted was adequate. The Board must evaluate th.e 
adequacy of the design of the facility and the ability of the applicant to carry out the management 
of the Nutrient Management Plan and other plans which may address any environmental 
concerns. It is not for this court to make these factual determinations but is only for the Board. 
It is the argument of the Intervenor that the Board has the discretion to deny a siting 
permit even if the applicant were to fully comply with and meet the criteria for approval. Such 
an argii:inent would · only support the proposition that the Board may act in an arbitrary .. and 
capricious manner in denying or approving a siting permit. This argument would be contrary to 
the legislative intent of §67-6529 and 67-6535. It is clear that any decision of the Board must be 
based on the standards and criteria set forth in the ordinance itself, although it is for the Board to 
interpret its own ordinance and such interpretation is entitled a presumption of validity, so long 
. . 
as it is reasonable. Agency action is "capricious if it is done without a rational basis" and 
''arbitrary if it was done in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without 
adequate determining principles." American Lung Ass 'n, 142 Idaho at 547, 130 P.3d at 1085. 
Lastly, in the event that the Board were to deny the siting permit, the Board in accordance 
with Ordinance #77, Section X and I.C. §67-6519(4) would be required to specify what action 
the applicant "could take to obtain a [siting]permit". 
Therefore this court must remand this matter to the Board so that it can make proper 
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. 
B. The Basis for the Granting or Denying a Siting Permit. 
The petitioner has argued that the Board considered factors that were not related to the 
Criteria for Approval for the siting permit. These factors consist of (1) the lack of roadway 
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infrastructure; (2) the lack of executed contracts for the transportation or export of solid waste; 
(3) the fact that 89% of the waste was to be exported from the site of the proposed CAFO; and 
( 4) the fact that the Board relied on and gave too much weight to the adverse public comment or 
opinion. 
Since the court is remanding this matter as set forth above, it may prove helpful to give 
some guidance for consideration on remand. In this regard, our courts have generally upheld 
actions of the local governing agencies in zoning matters whell their actions are free from 
"capriciousness and arbitrariness" and it is recognized that there is a strong presumption iri favor 
of the validity of the actions of local agencies in zoning matters as well as the interpretation of 
their ordinances and that the presumption may only be overcome upon a showing by the 
petitioner that the "ordinance as applied is confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious". 
Ready-to-Pour, Inc. v. McCoy, 95 Idaho 510,514,511 P.2d 792, 796 (1973). 
1. Roadway infrastructure. 
The County argues that the alleged lack of public roadway infrastructure within a mile of 
the proposed site is justification for the denial of the permit based on Ordinance #78 which 
provides that when a Special Use Permit is sought the proposed location must be served by 
adequate public facilities such as highways. However, the siting of a CAFO is a permitted and 
conforming use and does not require a Special Use Permit. Ordinance #77 in section VII merely 
requires that the application for the siting permit contain a letter from the Highway District 
approving the ingress and egress points on the Site Plan and that the Fire District approve the 
access roads of the CAFO on the site plan. Clearly, the ordinance as to this issue is in reference 
to the roads to be developed on the site plan by the applicant and the points at which they 
connect with the public highway or roads. 
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It cannot be disputed that the Highway District has the power to "regulate, restrict, or 
prohibit access" to highways under its jurisdiction, LC. § 40-604, including the right to restrict 
"the use of highways as authorized in Chapter 10, Title 49." I.C. § 49-208 (l)(g). Pursuant to 
that right, LC. § 49-1005, provides in relevant part as follows: 
Whenever in the judgment of the board or authorities in charge of, or 
having jurisdiction over a highway, the operation on any highway or section of 
highway of vehicles of sizes and weights at rates of speed permissible by law 
which will cause damage to the highway by reason of climatic or other conditions, 
or will interfere with the safe and efficient use of the highway by the traveling . 
public, the board or other authorities in charge of, or having jurisdiction· over a 
.. highway have authority to make regulations reducing the permissible sizes, 
weights or speeds of vehicles operated on that highway for any periods as may be 
necessary for the protection of the highway or for public safety. 
It is clear, based on I.C. § 49-1005, that a Highway District which has authority over the 
highways in its jurisdiction, may regulate the weights of vehicles traveling on its highways when 
it is determined that such weights "will cause damage to the highway by reason of climatic or 
other conditions, or will interfere with the safe and efficient use of the highway by the traveling 
public." Furthermore, the legislature has specifically granted these local authorities the power to 
reduce the permissible weights of such vehicles operating on these highways in order to protect 
the highway. Id. Lastly, pursuant to section 49-1005, a Highway District is required to post 
signs restricting vehicle weights "at each end of the highway or section and at intersections with 
main traveled highways." 
There is no evidence that there are any restrictions on the use of vehicles, such as weight 
or axle limitations, on the public roadways that connect to the proposed location of the CAFO. If 
such restrictions were in place as to the public road or highway at the ingress or egress point on 
the site plan, then one would assume that the Highway District would have denied approval of 




the access points to the public highway. Under the terms of the ordinance, the condition of the 
public highways is not a criteria for the approval or denial of the siting permit. 
It is clear that it is the responsibility of the applicant to procure from the Highway District 
a letter of approval of the points of ingress and egress from the dairy (site plan) to the public 
highway or road. It is unclear from the Highway District letter as to whether the Highway 
District has or has not approved the "ingress and egress points" on the site plan. This is a matter 
· for the Board to decide on remand. 
2. Execution of agreements for export of solid waste. 
The petitioner as part of his Nutrient Management plan attached copies of proposed 
contracts for the exportation of solid waste from the proposed site. The Board was concerned 
that the contracts had not been signed. The criteria for approval only requires that the applicant 
provide a copy of the nutrient management plan and letter of approval which was done. (R pg. 5; 
Exhibit # 11 ). It is tnle that the Waste Export Agreement was not executed, however, one might 
expect that such agreements would not be signed until the siting permit had been approved and 
clearly the Board would act withill'its discretion to require that they be executed as a condition to 
the issuance of an Occupancy Permit which is required under Section XII. Clearly, the Nutrient 
Management Plan would not go into effect until such time as an Occupancy Permit is issued. To 
deny a siting permit on this basis .alone would appear to be an abuse of discretion since the actual 
use of the property as a CAFO could not be commenced absent the issuance of an occupancy 
permit. 
3. The amount of solid waste to be exported from the CAFO. 
The Board, on the record, expressed concern that approximately 89% of the solid waste 
was to be exported from the dairy. It is unclear from the record as to how this is a concern and 
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how this concern relates to the criteria for approval. It is reasonable to assume that the Board 
would expect that the solid waste that is going to be produced must be disposed of in some 
reasonable manner and that some quantity is going to be removed from the proposed site. It 
appears form the record that much of the solid waste will be composted and exported in that 
fashion. This appears to be part of the nutrient management plan. Again, the Board in its brief 
suggests that it may look to ordinance #78 for the issuance of a Special Use Permit to support its 
concern. · Such is not the case since the proposed use is a ccinfoimlng use arid does not require · 
the issuance of a Special Use Pennit. Further; there does not appear to be any evidence i:0: the 
record that the Highway District has. imposed any restrictions concerning the transportation of 
solid waste on its }lighways. The Board, again, must focus upon and interpret the criteria for 
approval in Ordinance #77 which presumably addresses the Board's concerns for the public's 
• 
health and welfare. 
4. The consideration of public opinion. 
It is clear that the legislature has mandated that the Board must consider public comment 
when deciding to approve or reject a proposed site for a CAFO. l.C.§ 67-6529(2). However, the 
public comment that is considered must be relevant to the criteria for approval and the mere fact 
alone that a large number of citizens oppose the siting permit is not a legitimate basis to deny a 
siting permit for a. conforming use, unless that opinion is relevant to the criteria for approval. For 
· example the public opinion may prove to be relevant as to the determination of risk by the Site 
Advisory Team. The Board has the option to accept or reject the determination of risk by the Site 
Advisory Team under the terms of section 67-6529(2). The determination of risk is one of the 
factors for approval. This is a factual determination for the Board based on all of the relevant 
evidence and testimony. If the Board disagrees with the site risk assessment, it stands to reason 
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that they must provide a factual basis as to why they find the risk assessment to be greater than 
that determined by the Site Advisory Team. 
5. The Doctrine of Implied Preemption. 
The petitioner argues that the state, by the adoption of I.C. § 37-401 et. seq., has fully 
occupied the dairy management and the disposition of dairy waste. The petitioner asserts that the 
county is preempted from requiring that the waste export agreements be signed or from objecting 
to the amount of waste to be transported based on i:he doctrine of implied preemption. · In 
essence, the state has required the dairy operator to submit a nutrient management plan t~ be 
approved by the state prior to obtaining the issuance of a milk permit. Further, the statue 
authorizes the release of the information in that plan to the county in which the dairy farm is 
located or where the livestock waste is received. 
The court, in Heck v. Comm 'rs of Canyon County, 123 Idaho 826, 853 P.2d 571 (1993), 
discussed the doctrine of impiied preemption as follows: 
Where it can be inferred from a state statute that the state has intended to fully 
occupy or preempt a particular area, to the exclusion of [local governmental 
entities], a [local] ordinance in that area will be held to be in conflict with the 
state law, even if the state law does not so specifically state. 
Id. at 161, 610 P.2d at 520 (quoting Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 610 P.2d 517 (1980)). In 
E7'1virosafe Serv. of Idaho v. County of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 735 P.2d 998 (1987), the Court 
reiterated the Caesar standard and stated: 
The doctrine of implied preemption typically applies in instances where, 
despite the lack of specific language preempting regulation by local governmental 
entities, the state has acted in the area in such a pervasive manner that it must be 
assumed that it intended to occupy the entire field of regulation. 
Id, at 689, 735 P.2d at 1000. 
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The record establishes that the petitioner had obtained approval of the proposed nutrient 
management plan from the Department of Agricuiture as required, however, it is clear that the 
Department was only approving the plan, not the ability of the petitioner to comply with the plan. 
While the state may have occupied the approval of plans necessary to obtain a milk permit, 
however, the state has not fully occupied the permitting of dairies since the state has left to the 
counties the regulating of where and under what circumstances a dairy or CAFO may be sited. 
LC. §67-6529. • Section 37-401(4) does not restrict the manner in which the county may use the · 
infonnation in its determination to accept or reject a siting permit. Clearly, the Board may 
consider the design of the facility as well as the applicant's ability to manage the facility and 
implement the environmental plans that are contemplated as well as whether the environmental 
plans resolve environmental concerns in its decision to grant or deny a siting permit. It is the 
responsibility of the Board to make appropriate factual findings in this regard. 
V. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Both parties seek attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-117(1) which provides: "[I]n any 
administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency [or] a ... 
county, ... the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorneys fees, witness fees and 
reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." 
The purpose of section 12-117 is to serve as a "deterrent to groundless or arbitrary 
agency action" and to "provide a remedy for persons who have born unfair or unjustified 
financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes 
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agencies should never have made." Bogner v. State Dep 't. of Rev. and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 
859,693 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1984). 
It is clear that the Board and the Commission committed errors in the denial of the siting 
permit, which should not have been made. It is clear that the Board and the Commission relied 
on factors that are clearly not part of the criteria for approval under its own ordinance and that 
the denial of the permit was in many respects arbitrary and without a reasonable basis in law or 
fact, however, such a statement is not meant to suggest that the courl b implying whether the 
Board· should grant or deny the siting permit on remand, only that they need to make appropriate 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to support their decision. It is clear that the petitioner 
has borne an unjustified financial burden and that an award of reasonable attorneys fees would 
be appropriate. Therefore attorney fees are granted to the Petitioner and the Petitioner shall 
submit a Memorandum and affidavit in support a request for attorney fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
54(e) within 14 days of entry of this Memorandum Oecisiori. The attorney fees shall be limited 
to the Petition for Judicial Review. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
The court, for the reason set forth above, hereby vacates the Findings of Fact and 
Decision of the Board dated September 25, 2006 and remands the matter back to the Board to 
make proper findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. Attorney Fees are awarded to the Petitioner. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this / Q day of IAAOl( , 2007. 
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Depli% Clerk 
JAIRY CATTLE 
ANIMAL UNIT WORl<SHEET 
Jilfilrl!c!ions: fn column 2, enier the nwnber of eacll animal type present on !he operation. Mulliply that 
number uy the animal equivalcncy factor found in column 1. This will give you the singfe animal unit 
number lo ue enlered in column 3 (col. 1 x col. 2 "col. J). The lotal of all numbers in column 3 is lo Iola/ 
num!Jor of animal unils presenl on lhe CAFO. 
Animal Type 
.,Animal Equivalency 
·~ · Factor 
Numboron 
Ille Operation 
(2) . {1) 
---~·-··-·· 
····- - --··=·--· -- . '~.- --
3ulVHo/Stein Cow 1,400 Pounds 1.4 
Bull/Jersey Cow 1,000 Pounds 1.0 
Bu ti/Heifers 900-1, 100 Pounds 1.0 
l';ull/Heifers 700-899 Pounds .8 
ull/Heifers 500-699 Pounds ,6 
. 
:lulVHeifers 300-499 Pounds .4 






!cJUII (eac/1) LO 
,Jeers/Cows (over 1,000 lbs) .0 
Steers/Cows (600-1,000 lbs) .8 
c;alves (under 500 lbs) .4 I 
,WlNE 
Pigs (55 lbs-market) ).15 
figs (up lo 55 lbs) ).05 
. 
Sows (each) . 4 
Boars (each) .5 
! 
,HEEP each) 0.15 
. 
rORSES 1,000 lbs) 1,0 
over 1,000 lbs) 1,5 
FISH 1,000 lbs) 1.0 
CHICKENS 
ayers ( each) J.0033 
,<roilers (each) 1.0033 
FOR SPECIES NOT r 00 pounds) .1 
frPECIF!CALL Y 
OENTIFIED I 
TOTAL COMBINED ANIMAL UNITS 
TOTAL# OF ACRES ON THE CAFO 
!\NIMAL 
ANIMAL TYPES EQUIVALENCY 
=ACTOR 
· DAIRY CATTLE 
Bull/Holstein Cow 1,400 Pounds 1.4 .. , 
Bull/Jersev Cow 1,000 Pounds 1.0 
Bu!VHeifers 90Q..1, 100 Pounds 1.0 
'lull/Heifers 700-899 Pounds ).8 
3ull/Heifers 500-699 Pounds J.6 
.. 
Bull/Heifers 300-499 Pounds ).4 
Bull/Heifers 100-299 Pounds J.2 
. 
BEEF CATTLE/BISON · 
3ull (each) 1.0 .. .. 
. 
'" 
3teers/Cows (over 1,000 lbs) 1.0 .. 
3teers/Cows (600-1,000 lbs) ).8 
' 




"igs (55 lbs-market) 0.15 
. 
. 
"igs (up to 55 lbs) .. 0.05 
3ows (each) D.4 . 
.- 3oars (each) 0.5 
SHEEP . (each) D.15 
HORSES 1,000 lbs) 1.0 
over 1,000 lbs) 1.5 
·ISH 1,000 lbs) 1.0 
~HtCKENS 
Layers (each) 10033 
Broilers (each) ).0033 
=oR SPECIES NOT 100 pounds) ).1 
SPECIFICALLY 
1 DENTIFIED 
D. APPLICANT: A person or legal entity seeking.approvals or permits pursuant·to this 
ordinance having.an ownership interest in real property of-anature,sufficient ta 
determirie'" the-use to which the real property will be: put: as. pro.posed: irr the-appiicatiorn, 
for approvals, or·permits. · 
4 
I.C. 67-6502 PURPOSE. The purpose of this act shall be to promote the health, safety, 
and general welfare of the people of the state ofldaho as follows: 
(a) To protect property rights while making accommodations for other necessary types of 
development such as low-cost housing and mobile home parks. 
(b) To ensure that adequate public facilities and services are provided to the people at reasonable 
cost. 
( c) To ensure that the economy of the state and localities is protected. 
( d) To ensure that the important environmental features of the state and localities are protected. 
( e) To encourage the protection of prime agricultural, forestry, and mining lands for production 
of food, fibre, and minerals. 
(J) To encourage urban and urban-type development within incorporated cities. 
(g) To avoid undue concentration of population and overcrowding ofland. 
(h) To ensure that the development on land is commensurate with the physical characteristics of 
the land. 
(i) To protect life and property in areas subject to natural hazards and disasters. 
G) To protect fish, wildlife, and recreation resources. 
(k) To avoid undue water and air pollution. 
(l) To allow local school districts to participate in the community planning and development 
process so as to address public school needs and impacts on an ongoing basis. 
67-6503. PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. Every city and county shall 
exercise the powers conferred by this chapter. 
67-6529. APPLICABILITY TO AGRICULTURAL LAND -- COUNTIES MAY 
REGULATE SITING OF CERTAIN ANIMAL OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES. 
(1) No power granted hereby shall be construed to empower a board of county 
commissioners to enact any ordinance or resolution which deprives any owner of full and 
complete use of agricultural land for production of any agricultural product. Agricultural 
land shall be defined by local ordinance or resolution. (2) Notwithstanding any provision 
of law to the contrary, a board of county commissioners shall enact ordinances and 
resolutions to regulate the siting of large confined animal feeding operations and 
facilities, as they shall be defined by the board, provided however, that the definition of a 
confined animal feeding operation shall not be less restrictive than the definition 
contained in section 67-6529C, Idaho Code, including the approval or rejection of sites 
for the operations and facilities. At a minimum, a county's ordinance or resolution shall 
provide that the board of county commissioners shall hold at least one (1) public hearing 
affording the public an opportunity to comment on each proposed site before the siting of 
such facility. Several sites may be considered at any one (1) public hearing. Only 
members of the public with their primary residence within a one ( 1) mile radius of a 
proposed site may provide comment at the hearing. However, this distance may be 
increased by the board. A record of each hearing and comments received shall be made by 
the board. The comments shall be duly considered by the board when deciding whether to 
approve or reject a proposed site. A board of county commissioners may reject a site 
regardless of the approval or rejection of the site by a state agency. 
67-6529 A - intentionally omitted 
67-6529B. LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND PURPOSES. The legislature finds that: 
(1) Confined animal feeding operations increase social and environmental impacts in 
areas where these facilities are located; (2) The siting of confined animal feeding 
operations is a complex and technically difficult undertaking requiring assistance to 
counties and other units of local government as they exercise their land use planning 
authority; (3) It is in the interest of the state ofldaho that state departments and agencies 
use their particular expertise to assist counties and other local governments in the 
environmental evaluation of appropriate sites for confined animal feeding operations. 
67-6529C. DEFINITIONS. As used in this act, the following definitions 
shall apply: 
(1) "CAFO," also referred to as "concentrated animal feeding operation" 
or "confined animal feeding operation," means a lot or facility where the following 
conditions are met: 
(a) Animals have been, are, or will be stabled or confined and fed or 
maintained for a total of ninety (90) consecutive days or more in any 
twelve-month period; 
(b) Crops, vegetation, forage growth or postharvest residues are not 
sustained in the normal growing season over any portion of the lot or 
facility; and 
( c) The lot or facility is designed to confine or actually does confine as many as or 
more than the numbers of animals specified in any of the following categories: seven 
hundred (700) mature dairy cows, whether 
milked or dry; one thousand (1,000) veal calves; one thousand (1,000) 
cattle other than mature dairy cows or veal calves; two thousand five 
hundred (2,500) swine each weighing fifty-five (55) pounds or more; ten 
thousand (10,000) swine each weighing less than fifty-five (55) pounds; 
five hundred (500) horses; ten thousand (10,000) sheep or lambs; or 
eighty-two thousand (82,000) chickens. 
Two (2) or more concentrated animal feeding operations under common ownership 
are considered, for the purposes of this definition, to be a single animal 
feeding operation if they adjoin each other or if they use a common area or 
system for the disposal of wastes; 
(2) "CAFO site advisory team" shall mean representatives of the Idaho 
state department of agriculture, Idaho department of environmental quality and 
Idaho department of water resources who review a site proposed for a CAFO, 
determine environmental risks and submit a ·suitability determination to a 
county. The department of agriculture shall serve as the lead agency for the 
team; 
(3) "Environmental risk" shall mean that risk to the environment deemed 
posed by a proposed CAFO site, as determined and categorized by the CAFO site 
advisory team and set forth in the site advisory team's suitability 
determination report; 
(4) "Suitability determination" shall mean that document created and 
submitted by the CAFO site advisory team after review and analysis of a 
proposed CAFO site that identifies the environmental risk categories related 
to a proposed CAFO site, describes the factors that contribute to the 
environmental risks and sets forth any possible mitigation of risk. 
67-6529D. ODOR MANAGEMENT PLANS -- COUNTY REQUEST FOR 
SUITABILITY DETERMINATION -- LOCAL REGULATION. (1) Counties may 
require an applicant for siting of a CAFO to submit an odor management plan as part of 
their application. 
(2) A board of county commissioners considering the siting of a CAFO may 
request the director of the department of agriculture to fonn a CAFO site 
advisory team to provide a suitability determination for the site. 
(3) This act does not preempt local regulation of a CAFO. 
67-6529E. PROCESS FOR COUNTY REQUEST -- CONTENTS OF THE 
REQUEST. ( 1) A board of county commissioners shall submit its request for a 
suitability determination by a site advisory team in writing to the director of the 
department of agriculture and shall support its request by the adoption of a resolution. 
(2) Information in the request shall include, but not be limited to, the relevant legal 
description and address of a proposed facility, the actual animal capacity of the facility, 
the types of animals to be confined at the proposed facility, all information related to 
water and water rights of the facility, any relevant vicinity maps and any other 
information relevant to the site that will assist the site advisory team in issuing its 
suitability determination. The board of county commissioners shall also provide the 
site advisory team with a copy of the odor management plan for the CAFO, if required 
to be submitted by the site applicant at the time of application. 
67-6529F. DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBILITIES -- AUTHORITY TO ADOPT 
RULES AND CONTRACT WITH OTHER AGENCIES. (1) Upon the request of a 
board of county commissioners, the director of the department of agriculture shall form 
and chair a site advisory team specific to the request of the county. The director of the 
department of environmental quality and the director of the department of water 
resources shall provide full cooperation in the formation of the site advisory team. (2) 
The CAFO site advisory team shall review the infonnation provided by the county and 
shall visit the site as may be necessary in the judgment of the team. (3) Within thirty 
(30) days of receiving the request for a suitability determination by a board of county 
commissioners, the CAFO site advisory team shall issue a written suitability 
determination and provide a copy in writing to the board of county commissioners that 
requested the review. (4) Any director responsible for carrying out the purposes of this 
act may adopt administrative mies necessary or helpful to carry out those purposes. (5) 
Any director responsible for carrying out the purposes of this act may enter into 
contracts, agreements, memorandums and other arrangements with federal, state and 
local agencies to carry out the purposes of this act. 
67-6529G. REPORT OF CAFO SITE ADVISORY TEAM -- COUNTY ACTION. 
The board of county commissioners requesting the suitability determination, upon 
receipt of the written suitability determination report by the CAPO site advisory team, 
may use the report as the county deems appropriate. 
We"stl~w. 
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You, along with E. Scott Paul, Lincoln County Prosecuting Attorney, Mike Seib, Jerome County Prosecuting At-
torney, Nikki Cannon, Minidoka County Prosecuting Attorney, and Al Barrus, Cassia County Prosecuting Attor-
ney, have requested an Attorney General's Opinion regarding several questions, each of which can be categor-
ized as asking whether Idaho state law preempts local regulation of confmed animal feeding operations 
("CAFOs"). This opinion addresses the over-arching question you have presented. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Do Idaho's state laws pertaining to the regulation of confined animal feeding operations preempt county regula-
tion of such operations? 
CONCLUSION 
The state CAFO siting laws expressly autl10rize counties to "enact ordinances and resolutions to regulate the sit-
ing of large confined animal feeding operations and facilities .... " Idaho Code § 67-6529. The legislature recog-
nized that county regulation is necessary for the purpose of considering the social and environmental impacts as-
sociated with CAFOs. Idaho Code § 67-6529B. Thus, even though the legislature has delegated to the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and the Department of Environmental Quality the responsibility to regulate water quality 
and waste water management requirements for the ongoing operation of CAFOs, it is unlikely that a court would 
conclude that state laws pertaining to the regulation of CAFOs fully occupy the field and, therefore, preempt all 
local ordinances related to similar environmental concerns. For example, county ordinances that seek to ensure 
the appropriateness of the location of a CAFO in light of tl1e environmental characteristics of a site, such as set-
backs or maximum livestock density requirements, are likely to be upheld by a court. County ordinances, 
however, that seek to directly impose water quality or waste management requirements on the ongoing operation 
of CAFOs once sited are likely to be found in conflict with, and therefore preempted by, state law. Whether spe-
cific provisions of a local zoning ordinance conflict with state laws applicable to CAFOs requires an analysis of 
the particular ordinance at issue, along with the applicable state laws. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of 
this opinion. 
The lack of clarity with respect to the limits within which local governments may regulate CAFOs unfortunately 
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pits local government and the regulated industry against one another and leads to costly and potentially lengthy 
litigation. Legislative action to more clearly defme the respective regulatory authority of state agencies and local 
government is warranted. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Overview of Local Zoning Authority 
Article XII, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution provides: 
Any County or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, san-
itary and other regulations as are uot in conflict with its charter or with the general laws. 
*2 While land use plarming is primarily within the purview of local government, county ordinances that are in 
conflict with the geueral Jaws of the state are preempted. Idaho Const, art. Xll, § 2. A conflict between local and 
state law may arise in a nmnber of different situations. There may be a direct conflict between the two laws, 
which usually occurs when local law expressly allows what the state disallows and vice versa. State Y.,. Musser, 
67 Idaho 214, 176 P.2d 199 (1946); Envirosafe Services of Idaho, Inc. Y.,. ~ of Owyhee, l 12 Idaho 687, 
689, 735 P.2d 998, 1000 (1987). A conflict may also arise when state law addresses an entire field or area of 
regulation. Id When state law provides either expressly or by implication, that it preempts a field or area of reg-
ulation, county regulation in that field or area will be held to be in conflict with state general laws and in viola-
tion of the Idaho Constitution. Envirosafe, 112 Idaho at 689. Since none of the Idaho statutes applicable to beef 
or dairy CAFOs expressly preempt local regulation of CAFOs, this opinion analyzes and applies the doctrine of 
implied conflict preemption. 
B. Implied Preemption 
l. General Principles 
Idaho has adopted the doctrine of implied preemption, set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court as follows: 
Where it can be inferred from a state statute that the state has intended to fully occupy or preempt a particu-
lar area, to the exclusion of [local governmental entities], a [local] ordinance in that area will be held to be 
in conflict with the state law, even if the state law does not so specifically state. 
Envirosafe Services of Idaho, Inc. Y.,. County of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998, 1000 (1987) 
(additional citations omitted). There are two typical situations in which implied preemption is found. The first 
situation: 
[T]ypically applies in instances where, despite the lack of specific language preempting regulation by local 
governmental entities, the state has acted in the area in such a pervasive manner that it must be assumed that 
it intended to occupy the eutire field ofregulation. 
"The [local governmental entity J carmot act in an area which is so completely covered by general law as 
to indicate that it is a matter of state concern." 
Id. (citation omitted). The second situation: 
[W]ill also apply where unifonn statewide regulation is called for due to the particular nature of the subject 
matter to be regulated. 
[I]f the court fmds that the nature of the subject matter regulated calls for a uniform state regulatory scheme, 
supplemental local ordinances are preempted. 
Id. (additional citations omitted). 
2. Pertinent Factors 
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In Envirosafe, the court analyzed Idaho's Hazardous Waste Managemeut Act ("HWMA"), Idaho Code §§ 
39-440 l to 39-4432, to detenniue whether it implicitly preempted local regulation of hazardous wastes. After 
notiug that the HWMA, like the CAPO statutes analyzed hereiu, did not expressly preempt local regulation, the 
court noted the followiug factors: 
*3 I. The HWMA contained a statement of legislative intent which provided, in part, that the purpose of the 
HWMA was to enable the state to assume primacy over hazardous waste. 
2. The statement of legislative intent also mentioned the desire to avoid duplicative, overlapping or con-
flicting state and federal regulatory systems. 
3. The legislature also directed the Board of Health and Welfare to adopt rules and regulations regarding 
hazardous wastes witbin the state. 
4. The legislature gave the DHW director authority to cooperate with other states to provide for uniform 
state regulations. 
The court deemed those factors to "evince a strong legislative intent that regulation of the field of hazardous 
waste disposal be regulated by means of one, unifonn statewide scheme enabling this state to enter into mean-
ingful interstate agreements. Taken alone, this clear legislative iutent is more than sufficient to preempt the field 
and preclude local govermnental regulation of the subject matter." Id. at 690, 735 P.2d at 1001. 
Next, the court used the second or alternate analysis, to detennine whether the HWMA was a "comprehensive 
statutory scheme of the kiud which implicitly evidences legislative iutent to preempt the field." Id. The HWMA 
contained the followiug significant provisions: 
1. Regulation, trip pennits, and a manifest system for transporters. 
2. A pennit system for hazardous waste facilities. 
3. Recording and reporting requirements for generators and facilities. 
4. Fee systems and dedicated funds. 
5. Sections dealing with citizen suits, local governmental notice, interstate cooperation, and employment se-
curity. 
6. Broad enforcement provisions. 
The court also found it significant that the local ordiuance was mostly duplicative of the HWMA, and noted that 
courts iu several other states had held that unifonn, statewide treatment of hazardous waste was critical. 
Whether there are state laws that specifically authorize the county as well as the state to regulate in a particular 
area is also important to the field preemption analysis. In Attorney General Opiuion 83-6, the Attorney General's 
Office reviewed whether the Lake Protection Act preempted local regulation of lake encroaclnnents. The fact 
that there was no specific authority provided for county regulation of lake encroachments, but instead the county 
ordinance at issue was based upon general authority provided to the county in the Local Planning Act, supported 
the conclusion that the Lake Protection Act was intended to be the exclusive means of regulating Jake encroach-
ments. Similarly, in Envirosafe, there was nothing iu state law that specifically authorized a county to regulate 
hazardous waste; iustead, only the state was given specific authority to regulate. 
3. Policy and Local Deference 
In the Envirosafe decision, the comt carefully acknowledged the importance of local control, but noted that local 
control may be problematic in certain instances. 
*4 [T]he safe management and disposal of hazardous wastes is clearly an area which demands unifonn, 
statewide treatment .... Michigan is extremely limited in the number of facilities that handle this waste prop-
erly. This is due partly because no community wants hazardous waste facility [sic] in its viciuity. Thus, loc-
al interests strongly want to retaiu their control. However, the same reasoning easily justifies state control. 
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The legislature recognized that hazardous waste disposal areas evoke such strong emotions in localities that 
the decision as to where a landfill should go should not be given to the locality, which is far more swayed 
by parochial interests than the state, The legislature, instead, gave the power to a centralized decision maker 
who could act uniformly and provide the most effective means of regulating hazardous waste, [Township of 
Cascade v. Cascade Resource Recovery, Inc., 118 Mich. App, 580,325 N.W.2d 500,504 (1982),] 
It is important to note that the same considerations which permeated the holding in Township of Cascade are 
equally applicable here. The state of Idaho is limited to very few facilities which handle hazardous waste. 
Additionally, the treatment and storage of hazardous waste is a subject which inspires a unique amount of 
interest and concern from this state's citizenry. We recognize the unique importance of and benefit derived 
from local government regulation and that, ordinarily, local problems are best solved by local regulation, 
since local governmental entities are uniquely suited to fashioning workable solutions by virtue of their 
proximity to, and direct awareness of, the issues involved. By our ruling here, we in no way denigrate the 
function of local government. Instead, we acknowledge the unique importance and complexity of the subject 
matter. 
Envirosafe, 112 Idaho at 691,735 P.2d at 1002 (additional citations omitted). 
C. Pertinent Acts and Statutes 
Idaho Code contains several acts and statutes that authorize state agencies and counties to regulate various as-
pects of dairy and beef cattle CAPOs, Each will be discussed in tum. 
I. Jhe Beef Cattle Environmental Control M 
In 2000 the Idaho Legislature enacted the Beef Cattle Environmental Control Act, Idaho Code §§ 22-4901, et 
seq. (the "BCEC Act"). The BCEC Act contains the following declaration of policy and legislative intent: 
(I) The legislature recognizes the importance of protecting state natural resources including, surface water 
and ground water. It is the intent of the legislature to protect the quality of these natural resources while 
maintaining an ecologically soU11d, economically viable, and socially responsible beef cattle industry in the 
state. The beef cattle industry produces manure and process wastewater which, when properly used, supplies 
valuable nutrients, and organic matter to soils and is protective of the enviromnent, but may, when improp-
erly stored and managed, create adverse impacts on natural resources, including waters of the state, This 
chapter is intended to ensure that manure and process wastewater /JJiSOciated with beef cattle operations 
are handled in a manner which protects the natural resources of the state, 
*5 (2) Further, the legislature recognizes that the beef cattle industry is potentially subject to various state 
and federal laws designed to protect state natural resources and that the Idaho department of agricultnre is in 
the best position to administer and implement these various laws, It is therefore the intent of the legislature 
that the administration of this law by the department of agriculture fully meets the goals and requirements 
of the federal clean water act and state laws designed to farther protect state waters and that administration 
of this chapter by the department of agriculture shall not be more stringent than or broader in scope than the 
requirements of the clean water act and applicable state and federal laws. The department shall have author-
ity to administer all laws to protect the quality of water within the confines of a beef cattle animal feeding 
operation. In carrying out this chapter the department shall prioritize its resources on operations which have 
the greatest potential to significantly impact the enviromnent and ensure that any requirements imposed un-
der this chapter upon operators of beef cattle animal feeding operations are cost-effective and economically, 
environmentally and technologically feasible, 
(3) Successful implementation of this chapter is dependent upon the department receiving adequate funding 
from the legislature and is dependent upon the department executing a memorandum of agreement with the 
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United States environmental protection agency, the department of environmental quality and the Idaho 
cattle association which sets forth a working arrangement between the agencies to ensure compliance with 
this chapter and applicable state and federal laws, including the federal clean water act. Moreover, the legis-
lature recognizes that it is important for the state to obtain a delegated national pollutant discharge elimina-
tion system (NPDES) permit program from the EPA under the clean water act. 
Idaho Code § 22-4902 (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). The authority granted to the ISDA director by the Idaho 
Legislature is similarly worded: 
(I) The [ISDA director] through the division of animal industries is authorized to regulate beef cattle animal 
feeding operations to protect state natural resources, including surface water and ground water. 
(2) In order to carry out its duties under this chapter, the department shall be the responsible state depart-
ment to prevent any groundwater contamination from beef cattle animal feeding operations as provided un-
der section 39-120, Idaho Code. 
(3) The director shall have the authority to exercise any other authorities delegated by the director of the de-
partment of environmental quality regarding the protection of groundwater, surface water and other natural 
resources associated with confined animal feeding operations, and this shall be the authority for the director 
of the department of environmental quality to so delegate. 
(4) The director of the department of environmental quality shall consult with the director of the department 
of agriculture before certifying discharges from beef cattle animal feeding operations as provided under 33 
U.S.C. section 1341, 
*6 Idaho Code § 22-4903 (Supp. 2007). 
Each beef CAFO is required to have a nutrient management plan, and once approved, the plan "shall be imple-
mented and considered a best management practice." Idaho Code § 22-4906 (Supp. 2007). Best management 
practices ("BMPs") are defined as: 
[P]ractices, techniques or measures which are determined to be cost-effective and practicable means orpre-
venting or reducing pollutants from point sources or nonpoint sources to a level compatible with environ-
mental goals, including water quality goals aud standards for waters of the state. Best management practices 
shall be adopted pursuant to the state water quality management plan, the Idaho groundwater quality plan or 
this act. 
Idaho Code § 22-4904(3). Nutrient management plans, in turn, are defined as "plan[s] prepared in conformance 
with the nutrient management standards or other equally protective standard for managing the amount, place-
ment, form and timing of the land application of nutrients and soil amendments." Idaho Code § 22-4904(10) 
(emphasis added). 
Each beef cattle CAFO must also be designed and constructed in accordance with specific engineering stand-
ards, and plans and specifications must be submitted to and approved by ISDA in order to ensure the engineer-
ing standards are met. 
ISDA promulgated rules under the BCEC Act, geared toward waste/nutrient management. See Rules of the De-
partment of Agriculture Governing Beef Cattle Animal Feeding Operations, IDAPA 02.04.15.100 ("Beef 
Rules"). The Beef Rules defme BMPs as "[p]ractices as defmed in Title 22, Chapter 49, Idaho Code or other 
practices, techniques, or measures that are determined to be a cost-effective and practicable means of preventing 
or reducing pollutants from point or non-point sources to a level compatible with state environmental goals. " 
IDAPA 02.04.15.010.05 (emphasis added). In addition, "nutrient management plan" and "nutrient management 
standard" are defined by reference to the USDA NRCS Conservation Practice Standard, and/or federal regnla-
tions. See ID APA 02.04.15.010.12 and.13. 
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ISDA and DEQ are parties to The Idaho Beef Cattle Environmental Control Memorandum of Understanding 
("Beef MOU"); the other parties are EPA and the Idaho Cattle Association ("!CA"). The stated objectives of the 
Beef MOU are "to ensure, compliance with the [CWAJ and [BCEC Act]." Beef MOU, p. I. 
These working arrangements are designed to reduce duplicative inspection and compliauce efforts, increase 
the frequency of inspections of beef cattle animal feeding operations and provide a sound inspection and 
compliance program, in order to prevent pollution and protect water of the state and other natural resources 
in an environmentally proactive and economically achievable manner. 
Beef MOU, p. I. The MOU further provides that: 
Beef cattle AFOs, regardless of whether the AFO actually has an NPDES permit, are responsible to con-
struct, maintain and operate their facilities to prevent contamination of waters of the state by achieving the 
conditions specified in the Act and the [Guidelines] or [any applicable NPDES permits]. 
*7 Beef MOU, p. 2. Under the Beef MOU, ISDA has the lead rule "in development and review of ... (BMPs) for 
beef cattle AFOs, which protect Idaho's natural resources .... " Beef MOU, p. 2. The MOU also provides, 
however, that "Nothing in this MOU shall be construed to release beef cattle AFOs from complying with applic-
able local, state or federal environmental statutes, regulations, permits or consent orders." Beef MOU at page 6. 
2. Dairy Waste Management Statutes 
The statutory provisions pertaining to dairy waste are not contained in a separate act, but instead, are contained 
in title 37, chapter 4 (Sanitary Inspection of Dairy Products Act). Section 37-401 places certain mandatory du-
ties upon ISDA and specifically conditions the issuance of a milk permit on compliance with applicable county 
livestock ordinances: 
(2) Acting in accord with rules of the department, the director or agent of the department shall review plans 
and specifications for construction of new, modified or expanded waste systems and inspect any dairy farm 
to ascertain and certify sanitary conditions, waste systems and milk quality. 
(4) All dairy farms shall have a nutrient management plan approved by the department. The nutrient man-
agement plan shall cover the dairy farm site, and other land owned and operated by the dairy farm owner or 
operator. Nutrient management plans submitted to the department by the dairy farm shall include the names 
and addresses of each recipient. of that dairy farm's livestock waste, the number of acres to which the live-
stock waste is applied, and the amount of such livestock waste received by each recipient. The information 
provided in this subsection shall be available to the county in which the dairy farm, or the land upon which 
the livestock waste is applied, is located. If livestock waste is converted to compost before it leaves the 
dairy farm, only the first recipient of the compost must be listed in the nutrient management plan as a recipi-
ent of livestock waste from the dairy farm. Existing dairy farms shall submit a nutrient management plan to 
the department on or before My !, 200 l. 
(6) The director or his agent may issue a permit to sell milk for human consumption to a new or expanding 
dairy farm only upon presentation to the director by the new or expanding dairy farm of: 
(a) A certified letter, supplied by the board of county commissioners, certifying the new or expanding 
dairy farm's compliance with applicable county livestock ordinances; 
Idaho Code § 37-401. If a dairy has a violation regarding its waste system, ISDA is authorized to revoke the 
dairy's milk permit. In practical terms, this means that the milk for the days in question is processed and sold, 
but the value of the milk goes to the county in which the violation occurred, rather thau to the dairy's owner/ 
operator. Idaho Code§ 37-403. 
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ISDA has promulgated Rules of the Department of Agriculture Governing Dairy Waste. See .JDAPA 
02.04.14.000, et seq. (the "Dairy Rules"). The Dairy Rules defme "discharge violation" more broadly than the 
Beef Rules: 
*8 A practice or facility condition which has caused an unauthorized release of livestock waste into surface, 
ground water, or beyond the dairy farm's property boundaries or beyond the property boundary of any facil-
ity operated by the producer. Contract manure haulers, producers and other persons who haul livestock 
waste beyond the producer's property boundaries are responsible for releases of livestock waste between the 
property boundaries of the producer and the property boundaries at the point of application. 
IDAPA 02.04.14.004.05. Like the Beef Rules, the Dairy Rules contain a definition of a nutrient management 
plan that incorporates by reference a USDA NRCS nutrient management standard. 
The !SDA "Findings" contained in the Dairy Rules state: 
The Department finds that pursuant to Section 67-5226(1), Idaho Code, these rules are necessary to protect 
the public health, safety and welfare of Idaho, enhance Idaho water quality and preserve the integrity of the 
Idaho dairy industry. These rules establish design, construction, operation, location, and inspection criter-
ia for dairy waste systems on Idaho dairy farms and enable the department to implement the 1999 NRCS 
nutrient management standards on dairy farms to appropriately manage livestock waste. These rules also 
provide penalty provisions. 
IDAPA 02.04.14.005 (emphasis added). ISDA must approve the design, construction, operation and location of 
dairy waste systems, and those systems "must conform to the Idaho Waste Management Guidelines for Confined 
Feeding Operations, NMP, NMS, and Appendix lOD." IDAPA 02.04.14.01 I. 
Like the regulation of Beef cattle CAFOs, ISDA, IDEQ and EPA are parties to a Dairy MOU that sets out the 
manner in which the parties shall coordinate in the regulation of dairy CAFOs. The MOU provides, however, 
that "[n]othing in this agreement shall be construed to release a dairy from complying with applicable local, 
state, and federal environmental statutes, regulations, permits, or consent orders." Dairy MOU, p. 5. 
3. Agriculture Odor Management Act 
In 2001 the Idaho Legislature enacted the Agriculture Odor Management Act, Idaho Code §§ 25-3801, et seq. 
(the "AOMA"). Pursuant to the AOMA, DEQ regulates odors from large swine and poultry operations, while 
odors from Beef CAFOs are regulated by ISDA under the BCEC Act. ISDA is also the lead agency for regulat-
ing odors from "operations where livestock or other agricultural animals are raised, or crops are grown, for com-
mercial purposes, not to include [large swine and poultry operations and beef CAFOs)." Idaho Code §§ 
25-3801(3) and 25-3803(3) (Supp. 2007). 
The legislature's declaration of policy provides: 
(1) The agriculture industry is a vital component of Idaho's economy and during the normal course of produ-
cing the food and fiber required by Idaho and our nation, odors are generated. It is the intent of the legis-
lature to manage these odors when they are generated at a level in excess of those odors normally associated 
with accepted agricultural practices in Idaho. 
*9 ... . 
(3) ... In canying out the provisions of this chapter, the [ISDA] will make reasonable efforts to ensure that 
any requirements imposed upon agricultural operations are cost-effective and economically, environ-
mentally and technologically feasible. 
Idaho Code § 25-3801 (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). The ISDA director is authorized to promulgate agricul-
ture odor rules. 
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Pursuant to the AOMA, ISDA promulgated the Rules Governing Agriculture Odor Management, IDAPA 
02.04.16.100, et seq. The Rules provide that management practices which are undertaken in accordance with the 
Rules Governing Dairy Waste; the Rules Governing Pesticide and Chemigation Use and Application; Rules 
Concerning Disposal of Cull Onion and Potatoes; Rules Governing Dead Animal Movement and Disposal; the 
Idaho NRCS Nutrient Management Standard 590, June 1999; Best Management Practices listed in the "Idaho 
Agricultural Pollution Abatement Plan," August 2001; "Control of Manure Odors," ASAE Standard EP379.2 
Sections 5 and 6 in their entirety, November 1997; and/or "Composting Facility," NRCS Conservation Practice 
Standard 317, March 2001; are considered accepted agricultural practicesJFN11 
Despite the implementation of accepted agricultural practices, if an agricultural operation still generates odors in 
excess of those typically associated with that type of agriculture, the operation must develop and submit an odor 
management plan to ISDA. ISDA is further charged with reviewing and approving design plans for all new or 
modified liquid waste systems prior to construction. IDAPA 02.04.16.300. The systems must be designed by a 
professional engineer. The rules set forth general design standards, provide for inspections, and set forth the pro-
cess and requirements for an odor management plan. 
ISDA must respond to all odor complaints lodged against agricultural operations, and handles violations of the 
Rules. 
4. CAFO Siting Laws and Rules 
Although state agencies (particularly ISDA and DEQ) have a large role in regulating CAFOs, the Idaho Legis-
lature has also recognized the role of counties in siting of CAFOs. Idaho Code § 67-6529 specifically requires 
that "[n]otwlthstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a board of county commissioners shall enact 
ordinances and resolutions to regulate the siting of large confined animal feeding operations and facilities, 
as they shall be defined by the board .. ,." Idaho Code § 67-6529(2) (emphasis added). Section 67-6529 also 
provides that a county "may reject a site regardless of the. approval or rejection of the site by a state agency." 
This section applies to both dairy and beef CAFOs. 
In 2001 the legislature passed the Site Advisory Team Suitability Determination Act, Idaho Code §§ 67-6529A, 
et seq. That Act allows a county to call upon '!SDA to form a site advisory team "to assist counties and other loc-
al governments in the environmental evaluation of appropriate sites for confmed animal feeding operations." 
Idaho Code § 67-6529B. The site advisory team includes representatives from ISDA, IDEQ and the Idaho De-
partment of Water Resources. If requested, the team must review information provided by the county and 
provide the county with a suitability determination that identifies the environmental risks posed by a proposed 
CAPO site, describes factors that contribute to the environmental risks and sets forth any possible mitigation of 
risk. Idaho Code §§ 67-6529C(2), (3) and (4); 67-6529F(3). Upon receipt of the report from the team, the county 
may use the report as the county deems appropriate. Idaho Code § 67-65290. The Act also provides that 
counties may require an applicant for siting of a CAFO to submit an odor management plan as part of the applic-
ation. Notably, the Act specifically provides that "this act does not 
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even when the state has not fully occupied the field, implied preemption may occur when a specific county or-
dinance is found to be in conflict with state law. There is no doubt that the legislature intended for the Idaho De-
partment of Agriculture to administer a comprehensive program to regulate the operation of beef cattle CAPO 
wastewater storage and containment facilities. In enacting the Beef Cattle Control Act, the Idaho Legislature 
stated its intent to protect "state natural resources including, surface water and ground water," Idaho Code § 
22-4902, by ensuring "that manure and process wastewater associated with beef cattle operations is handled in a 
manner which protects the natural resources of the state." Id. This objective was to be achieved through submis-
sion of a nutrient management plan for each CAPO to the Idaho Department of Agriculture: Idaho Code § 
22-4905. Through this Act, the legislature sought to preclude conflicting state and federal regulation and stated 
its intent that "administration of this law by the department of agriculture fully meets the goals and requirements 
of the federal clean water act and state laws designed to further protect state waters .... " Idaho Code § 22-4902(2). 
In many ways, the Beef Cattle Control Act standing alone seems to mirror the factors cited by the Idaho Su-
preme Court in Envirosafe as a basis for finding an implied preemption of local regulation. State law provides 
authority to !SDA to regulate the design and construction of beef cattle CAPOs and the manner in which nutri-
ents and soil amendments are land applied. The beef cattle law includes statements that indicate the legislature 
intended to create a state-wide program to protect state natural resources, including surface and groundwater 
quality. In addition, the legislature sought to ensure state primacy over the regulation of CAFO wastewater stor-
age and containment facilities for beef cattle operations. Finally, the legislature sought to protect a state re-
source-water-that has traditionally been exclusively regulated by the State. Idaho Code § 42-201(2) (2003). 
State law provides similar authority to ISDA regarding dairy CAFOs. 
Unlike the situation considered in Envirosafe, however, state law provides specific authority to counties to regu-
late the siting of dairy and beef cattle CAFOs. Idaho Code §§ 67-6529 through 67-6529G (2006). Indeed, Idaho 
Code § 67-6529 expressly provides that "[n]otwithstanding any provision of the law to the contrary, a board 
of county commissioners shall enact ordinances and resolutions to regulate the siting of large confined animal 
feeding operations and facilities, as they shall be defined by the board .... " These siting statutes direct that 
counties consider the "social and environmental impacts" arising from the location of CAFOs. Thus, counties 
are authorized to review and take into account information regarding the environmental risks posed by a CAFO. 
Idaho Code § 67-6529G (2006). This obviously could include risks to ground and surface water quality and air 
quality. In addition, counties are specifically authorized to require CAPOs to submit odor management plans. 
Idaho Code § 67-6529D (2006). There are also several other Idaho Code provisions that appear to recognize a 
more general regulatory role for counties. Finally, the Site Advisory Team Suitability Determination Act 
provides that it does not preempt local regulation of a CAFO. Idaho Code § 67-6529D (2006). The state dairy 
law also recognizes the requirement that dairy CAFOs comply with applicable local livestock ordinances. 
*11 In light of the significant role provided for counties in the siting of CAFOs, it is unlikely that a court will 
find that local regulation of the entire field of CAFO regulation is preempted. On the other hand, the legislature's 
express delegation of regulatory authority over operational aspects of CAFOs to the Department of Agriculture 
and the Department of Environmental Quality suggests that a court may, under a conflict analysis, determine an 
ordinance imposing restrictions that unduly interfere with state operational requirements for CAFOs is preemp-
ted. There is no bright line between what constitutes a siting condition and an operational condition. The mere 
fact that a local siring ordinance contains environmental conditions for the siting of a CAFO that may also be 
addressed in a nutrient management plan is not determinative of the question of whether the local ordinance is 
preempted. One must analyze the specific ordinance in question, in light of the pertinent legal provisions de-
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scribed above, in order to detennine whether a local ordinance related to siting conflicts witb state regulatory au-
thority over the operation of CAFO wastewater storage and containment facilities. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the legislature has authorized both the counties and the State to regulate CAFOs, and because these au-
thorities overlap, it is unlikely that a court would conclude the State has completely occupied the field of CAFO 
regulation or that state Jaw provides an exclusive regulatory program that preempts all local regulation. Al-
though counties have authority to regulate siting of dairy and beef cattle CAFOs, county ordinances that seek to 
impose operational constraints on the ongoing operation of a CAFO after it is sited are likely preempted. Each 
ordinance must be analyzed separately along with applicable state law to determine whether such a conflict ex- ists. 
1. Idaho Constitution: 
A1t. XII, § 2. 










§§ 39-4401 to 39-4432. 
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§ 67-6529F. 
§ 67-6529G. 
3. Administrative Rules: 







ID APA 02.04.15.100, et seq. 
IDAPA 02.04.16.010.01. 
IDAPA 02.04.16.100, et seq. 
IDAPA 02.04.16.300. 
IDAPA 02.04.18.100, et seq. 
4. Idaho Cases 
Envirosafe Services o0daho, Inc. y, County of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687,735 P.2d 998 (1987). 
State y, Musser, 67 Idaho 214, 176 P.2d 199 (1946). 
5. Other Authorities 
1983 Idaho Att'y Gen. Ann. Rpt. 69. 
*12 The Idaho Beef Cattle Environmental Control Memorandum of Understanding. 
Dated this l day of August, 2008. 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
Analysis by: 
Angela Schaer Kaufinann 
Douglas Conde 
Deputy Attorneys General 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Page 12 of 13 
Page 11 
http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?utid= 1&sv=Split&prid=ia7448749000001... 5/19/2009 LJ(\ 
Page 13 of 13 
Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 08-1, 2008 WL 3895659 (Idaho A.G.) Page 12 
FNI. "Accepted agricultural practices" are "those management practices normally associated with agriculture in 
Idaho, including but not limited to those practices identified in Section 100 of these rules, and which include 
management practices intended to control odor generated by an agricultural operation." IDAPA 02.04.16.010.0 l. 
Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 08-1, 2008 WL 3895659 (Idaho A.G.) 
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